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Abstract
CONTRIBUTORY and volunteer computing ecosystems built around a communityof participants need, like any other common-pool resources, an adaptive gov-
ernance mechanism to guarantee the sustainability of the ecosystem. Reciprocity
incentive mechanisms based on economic principles have been proved efficient so-
lutions to regulate the resource sharing and allocation in large computing archi-
tectures, guaranteeing a direct retribution for each individual contribution even in
presence of misbehaving users. However, while these mechanisms preserve the
macro-equilibrium of the computational shared resources (e.g., CPU or memory),
participants with fewer resources face problems competing for the attention of other
members with more resources to cooperate with; making it difficult to apply such
principles in practice. Additionally, active members of the community contributing
in other aspects (e.g., doing administrative tasks or developing software) are not con-
templated in traditional schemes although their time and effort are also part of the
common-pool resource and hence, should be retributed somehow.
The aim of this thesis is to revisit some of the architectural aspects of current systems
and propose a framework to govern contributory and volunteer computing ecosys-
tems in a fairer way based on principles of participatory economics. Our main con-
tributions in this thesis are threefold. First, we examine the mechanisms ruling the
resource sharing and propose a new reciprocal incentive mechanism that measures
participants’ effort on sharing resources instead of their direct contribution, so it
increases the collaboration opportunities of users with fewer resources in heteroge-
neous scenarios. Second, we propose a regulation mechanism for allocating new
computational devices and distribute new resources within them, with the objective
of increasing their impact in the common-pool resources when the demand of re-
sources is supplied by the community. Third, we propose new methods to detect
and analyze the social positions and roles of the community members, enabling the
governance mechanism to be adapted taking into account members’ effort on several
tasks not considered otherwise.
The main contributions of this thesis conform a single framework that has been
tested experimentally, using simulations, in a resource-sharing environment with
non-strategic participants. Potentially, the mechanisms developed in this thesis will
open new opportunities to apply political-economic and social ideas to the new gener-
ation of volunteer, contributory or grid computing systems; as well as other common-
pool resources scenarios.
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Resum
ELS sistemes de computació voluntària o contributiva construïts al voltant de co-munitats de participants necessiten, com qualsevol altre common-pool resource,
mecanismes de govern adaptatius que garanteixin la sostenibilitat de l’ecosistema.
Els incentius recíprocs basats en principis econòmics han demostrat ser solucions
eficients per regular la compartició i assignació de recursos en arquitectures de gran
escala, garantint una retribució directa per cada contribució, inclús en presència
d’usuaris maliciosos. No obstant això, mentre aquests mecanismes preserven el
macro equilibri dels recursos compartits (p. ex., CPU o memòria), els participants
amb menys recursos tenen problemes per competir per l’atenció dels altres membres
amb més recursos quan volen cooperar amb ells; fent difícil en la pràctica aplicar
aquests principis. A més a més, els membres actius de la comunitat contribuint en
altres aspectes (p. ex., realitzant tasques administratives, o desenvolupant software)
no es torben contemplats en els esquemes tradicions tot i que el seu temps i esforç
també son part del common-pool resource i, per tant, haurien de ser compensats.
L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi és revisar alguns dels aspectes d’arquitectura que fan que
aquestes estratègies no funcionin i proposar un framework per governar ecosistemes
de computació voluntària o contributiva d’una manera més justa utilitzant principis
de participació econòmica. Primer, examinem els mecanismes que controlen la com-
partició de recursos i proposem un nou mecanisme d’incentiu recíproc que mesura
l’esforç dels participants mentre comparteixen recursos en comptes de la seva con-
tribució directa, de manera que les oportunitats per cooperar incrementen pels usuaris
amb menys recursos. En segon lloc, proposem un mecanisme per regular l’assignació
de noves màquines de computació i recursos, amb l’objectiu de millorar el seu im-
pacte en escenaris amb common-pool resource quan la demanda de recursos ha de
ser subministrada col·lectivament. Tercer, proposem nous mètodes per detectar i
analitzar els rols i posicions socials dels membres de la comunitat, permetent que els
mecanismes de govern es puguin adaptar tenint en compte l’esforç dels participants
en altres tipus de tasques prèviament no contemplades.
Les principals contribucions d’aquesta tesi formen un únic framework que ha es-
tat provat experimentalment, utilitzant simulacions, en un escenari de compartició
de recursos amb participants no estratègics. Potencialment, els mecanismes de-
senvolupats en aquesta tesi obriran noves oportunitats per aplicar idees politico-
econòmiques i socials a la nova generació de sistemes de computació voluntària,
cooperativa o grid, així com escenaris common-pool resource.
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Outline
This thesis consists on three parts. The first part describes the context of the research,
the second part presents and analyzes the three main contributions of my work, and
the last part discusses how to integrate the different proposals in a real context.
The context part aims to provide a general and rich picture of the research objectives
of this thesis. The Chapter 1 introduces the research statement and the problem to
be addressed. The Chapter 2 introduces each of the research questions, emphasiz-
ing how and why they relate with the main research objectives of this thesis. The
Chapter 3 reviews the foundation of most of the work presented, while the Chapter 4
describes the specific methodologies, methods and tools used.
The second part contains Chapters 5, 6, 7 which describes in detail the main contri-
butions of the present work as isolated problems that need to be addressed to fulfill
our ultimate goal. These three chapters are mostly based on the publications list
presented above. Thought they are connected with the same context, they should be
readable independently and in a different order, provided that the reader is familiar
with the corresponding methodologies, methods and tools described in Section I.
The final part consists on two chapters. Chapter 8 describes how the different mech-
anisms proposed in Section II can be used together in a single framework and how
to generalize most of the previous results. The Chapter 9 discusses the limitations,
implications and potential future directions of this thesis.
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Part I
Context
1

Chapter1
Introduction
Advances in computing and networking technologies improve everyday. The
cost reduction of powerful computing devices — including mobile devices
— and network connections make them accessible to most people, opening
new opportunities for developing distributed architectures aimed to share
computational resources.
Different computing paradigms appeared to model how resources are shared
and/or aggregated and what roles are assigned to the users of the system. In
this thesis we focus our attention in computing architectures for cooperative
systems, in which the pool of resources is owned and shared by the users
themselves — who will act simultaneously as providers and consumers —, like
volunteer and contributory computing.
In volunteer computing [1, 2] architectures, for example, users combine dedi-
cated and non-dedicated resources to perform complex computational tasks
split in smaller jobs run independently on each device. In contributory comput-
ing [3], however, jobs run on top of long-lived decentralized services distributed
within the users’ computational resources. Despite the differences on how jobs
are assigned to each device, in both models the participating users are engaged
3
4in a cooperative 1 process.
In both architectures, from the point of view of users, running tasks or deploying
services has no apparent cost. The extra resources needed are temporally
borrowed from other users transparently by the middleware software, giving
them the false sensation of unlimited access to an unbounded amount of
resources. In reality, there is a competitive component as the number of
aggregated resources is actually limited by the total amount contributed by all
users and the dynamics of the system. This cooperative model — where a set
of non-excludable goods are used in a competitive environment — has been
named as a common-pool resource.
Hardin [5] argued that the unrestricted access to a common-pool resource leads
to a saturation point, where the individuals demand of resources is higher than
the overall provision. The same problem has been found in other distributed
schemas, like Peer-to-Peer file-sharing networks, where some users — called
free-riders — intend to improve their bandwidth usage by downloading content
from the network without contributing with their own content. This problem,
formally known as the tragedy of the commons has been subject of research in
the fields of economics, sociology and computer science.
Contributory-based incentives have been proposed as a regulation mechanism
for common-pool resources in decentralized computing architectures. The
general idea behind these mechanisms is to distribute the computational
resources (e.g., CPU or memory) according to the users past contributions.
They have been proved good solutions to maximize the fairness (in terms of
resources consumption and contribution) for each user locally. Although these
mechanisms guarantee a sustainable computing system, in practice they punish
users with fewer resources in highly heterogeneous scenarios.
To briefly recall the problem, consider the Figure 1.1 matrix of uploaded traffic
between each pair of peers — averaged over all runs — in a Peer-to-Peer
experiment performed by Legout et.al. [84]. Darker squares represent more
data (bytes). Peers 1 to 13 have a lower upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a
medium one and peers 28 to 40 have a higher upload limit. In the experiment,
the common-pool resource — bandwidth — is regulated by a contributory
1Cooperative in the context of this thesis means that the “interaction is characterized by
positive goal interdependence with individual accountability” [4]
5Figure 1.1: Aggregate amount of uploaded data in a Peer-to-Peer experiment
mechanism, that enforces each node to download data proportionally to how
much it uploads. While it prevents the collapse of the Peer-to-Peer system,
we can observe that, as a consequence, nodes with larger resources tend to
cooperate only among them, because otherwise they will see their download
ratio limited. Therefore, nodes with fewer resources are constrained to upload
and download data only among them too. It results in a cooperative divided
scenario, that punishes particularly nodes with fewer resources.
Problem statement
In computational systems with heterogeneous resources, the cooper-
ation clustering problem might prevent punished nodes from getting
enough resources to start their own jobs. Therefore, users will not
see any reason to remain in the ecosystem, eventually causing a lack
of resources and leading it to its saturation point.
The aim of this thesis is to revisit some of the architectural aspects of current
systems and propose a framework to govern contributory and volunteer comput-
ing ecosystems in a fairer way based on principles of participatory economics.
Participatory economics [7] is an economic system based on decision-making,
where the rights — the ability of decide of some individual — is proportional
6to their actions — how much he had made for the community. Therefore, the
economic system is based on policies that compensate the effort or sacrifice
rather than absolute contributions.
Proposed solution
Our working hypothesis is that effort-based incentives will achieve higher
cooperation than contributory-based incentives and will be more inclusive with
those users with fewer resources, provided that the incentives are enforced by
some external entity — the community of practitioners.
As we will demonstrate, effort-based incentives will normalize the cooperation
opportunities of each participant, canceling the negative effects of the hetero-
geneity. While these strategies are strictly equitable, it is true that nodes with
more resources could increase their individual outcome — in detrimental of
the overall welfare — by using traditional strategies instead. Therefore, our
mechanisms require enforcing its adoption.
Ostrom [6] observed that in many common-pool resources (e.g., farming fields)
this task is managed successfully as a collective action, instead of lying on
some external ruler. Following the same principle, in this thesis we explore
the idea of using the community of user of the cooperative applications to
enforce our resource sharing mechanism. This solution, however, requires an
active participation of users — who will need to devote part of their time and
effort to this task. Therefore, our framework also includes a mechanism to
encourage users’ participation in supporting tasks by compensating them with
extra resources in the common pool.
Chapter2
Research statements
The purpose of this research is to guide system designers for cooperative ap-
plications and members of common-pool resources on developing government
mechanisms more inclusive, by providing fairer collaboration ratios among their
members. To that end, in this thesis we propose and evaluate a new framework
for regulating resource sharing inside cooperative applications’ communities.
To accomplish the above objective this research focuses on designing and under-
standing new incentives capable of measure, compare and use the effort (e.g.,
time, computational resources) devoted by the members of communities built
around cooperative applications’ to improve the welfare of the community, and
use them to increase the overall collaboration.
While the specific contributions of this thesis are presented in detail in chap-
ters 5, 6 7 and 8; in this chapter the main research questions and results are
introduced.
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8Encouraging resource-sharing efforts
In cooperative applications, substituting traditional reciprocity-based
incentives for others based on participatory economic principles will
increase the collaboration opportunities of the poorest participants
(in terms of resources)? Assuming that this is true, Does the new incentive
guarantee a larger percentage of successful jobs?
As we have introduced, the free and unrestricted access to common resources
might lead to an unsustainable situation, where the overall demand for com-
putational resources exceeds the current provision. It is a consequence of the
selfish behaviour of most users, who believing that their increment of demand
would not be noticed they try to increase their profit by consuming more
resources than other users.
Reciprocity-based incentives [8] has been proved good solutions to regulate
how to acces shared resources. By construction, in reciprocity-based incentives
the consumption of resources is proportional to some evaluation function,
measured directly or indirectly by peers. Almost all reciprocal incentives are
also contributory-based, meaning that the evaluation function is proportional
to the amount of resources the requesting user had contributed previously with.
As an example, in bitTorrent file-sharing system [9] the amount of downloading
traffic allowed to an user is, in average, equal to its upload traffic multiplied
by a constant.
One key advantage of contributory systems 1 is that encourage users’ participa-
tion by rewarding their good will, instead of punishing those not participating.
Following our example of bitTorrent, the only way users can get more resources
from the network is by increasing their contribution and being connected with
users with higher cooperation willingness. As a result, users are rearranged
by sharing capabilities and willingness into clusters of similarity. Therefore,
users with fewer resources are in unfavorably positions when they compete
for possible resources, although they are more willing to cooperate than other
users with larger amounts of resources.
We believe that if users’ reciprocity would be measured in relative terms rather
1In this thesis we use the term contributory-based incentive as a synonymous of “reciprocal
and contributory incentives”
9than in absolute values, then any participant will have the same opportunities
to cooperate. Chapter 5 introduces a series of reciprocity-based incentives
inspired by the same principles of participatory economics, which uses indirect
and direct relative evaluation functions. We show that these mechanisms lead
to scenarios where poorest participants (in terms of resources) achieve higher
cooperation ratios than in traditional incentives. It has a positive effect on the
sharing architecture, increasing the overall number of jobs fully satisfied.
However, as the new mechanisms have been designed to encourage the partic-
ipation of a small fraction of the population, it could rise concerns in other
users with larger amount of resources.
Is this incentive observed fair for nodes with larger amount of resources? What
are the practical implementation issues?
Answering the first question required an extensive analysis of the resources
distribution, which shown that our mechanism not only increases the overall
cooperation willingness; but also increases the utilitarism of the computational
resources.
The second question has been addressed by analyzing the robustness of the
mechanism in the presence of liers nodes — those misreporting their maximum
sharing capacities — and uncertainty in the evaluation function.
The main results presented in Chapter 5 related with this contribution were
originally reported in [P1, P2].
Provisioning resources in scarcity scenarios
In higher heterogeneous architectures for cooperative applications,
under which conditions devices with fewer resources are able to
cooperate with others? What additional resources are needed to encourage
collaboration among them? Is there an ideal ratio between nodes with few and
many resources that maximizes the overall cooperation willingness?
Lack of computational resources in highly dense overlay topologies might slow
down the growth of the community of users, making hard for users to get
enough resources for running complex computational jobs without bypass some
of its peers. In a direct reciprocity scenario, for example, two connected users
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are only allowed to share with each other a limited amount of resources. As
the average degree of the nodes involved in the collaboration process increases,
they need to reduce the maximum of resources given to each other in order to
avoid the tragedy of the commons.
One possible solution that we explore is to encourage the community members
to borrow or deploy new computer devices, managed individually or collectively,
to supply the demand. Then, various questions arise when we try to analyze the
cooperation support provided by several overlay network topologies involving
heterogeneous hardware devices. In particular, it is interesting to study the
effect of introducing devices with higher computational capabilities in a scenario
without much resources per node, which would probably change the network
behaviors; turning the system into a high heterogeneous scenario with two
clusters of nodes.
The analysis performed in Chapter 6 and [P5] reveals that in direct reciprocity
scenarios, introducing external resources improves the level of cooperation
among nodes with fewer resources, provided that the ratio between extra
computational devices and extra resources is maintained. As an example,
introducing only one extra device with huge amount of resources has a minimum
impact on the collaboration process if the exchange of resources happens
between nodes directly connected.
Various related works [10, 11, 8, 12] show that network topology characteristics
play a role in the collaboration, and that it can also encourage and promote
cooperation if certain conditions are present. Thus, we not only expect that
introducing devices with more resources in the network will promote collab-
oration, but we also believe that the collaboration level is highly dependent
on the network topology and on how resources are distributed among nodes.
Consequently, new research questions arise:
Are the topologies used to support collaboration in various fields (e.g. game
theory, neural networks, file sharing) applicable to resource sharing on a het-
erogeneous collaboration scenario? If the answer is yes, then Is the nodes’
placement strategy a variable that can be used to improve nodes’ cooperation?
These research questions are not relevant in some architectures like cloud
or grid computing, where the cooperative applications have no visibility or
control on the network topology. Therefore, nodes cannot take particular
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actions (e.g. increasing the network degree), to improve the collaboration
among them. Instead, in cooperative applications — where the exchange of
resources is controlled by the overlay topology — who is allowed to share (and
compete) with can be controlled easily. Furthermore, community members of
resource-pool resource might enforce them by social pressure.
The answers to these last questions are the central topic of Chapter 6, which is
based on the research results presented in [P3, P4].
Effort-based incentives for cooperative applications
How users’ participation on supporting activities can influence the
sharing process? What are the components needed? Is it possible to influence
supporting activities by users’ participation in the sharing process at the same
time?
We have seen how effort-based mechanisms encourage the cooperation in sce-
narios with higher heterogeneity of computational resources. In the absence of
nodes with large amount of resources, we have provided a placement algorithm
to supply this demand with collective computer devices. Both mechanisms are
indifferent to selfish or misbehaving nodes as they assume the existence of a
community of users supporting and governing the shared infrastructure.
In the first part of Chapter 7 and [P8] we have studied the participation
of members in a common-pool resource aimed to build and share network
connectivity, and have observed that only a very small fraction of the population
are willing to overtake these tasks. Thus, we focus our attention on how the
community members can be encouraged to participate in other aspects of
the ecosystem besides the main activity — in this case, sharing and building
network infrastructures.
We believe that a new regulation mechanism, able to provide some reward
based on how much users participate in the supporting and governing tasks, can
increase the number of users willing to participate. In Chapter 8 and [P9] we
focus our attention on designing and evaluating the new regulation mechanism,
under the assumption that there exists some externality — maybe a social
process, or another mechanism — scoring each community member based on
its participation in the supporting activities.
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The framework uses this score to modify the information exchanged among
users, allowing users with higher scores to announce smaller values of resources
own, increasing then the ratio of shared and own resources. As the social-effort
scores are managed privately by the economic framework — and are not shared
with any user in the system — users cannot distinguish in which activity their
neighbours are really participating. This design decision has the advantage of
preventing strategic users from getting undeserved advantages or to concentrate
their efforts on just one activity. The Chapter 8 focuses on designing and
evaluating this new mechanism.
Is it possible to generalize the framework for architectures with multiple resources
or supporting activities?
Based on the previous results, we generalized our framework to work with
multiple resources and supporting activities, so that the amount of resources
a given user gets from its neighbours is based on its participation in the
overall community, rather than a particular activity. We also show how our
generalization allows system designers to weight the impact of every activity
individually, enabling each common-pool resource community to design their
own governing policies.
These design decisions follow the general principles of participatory economics,
in which users’ reward is a measure of the effort they devote to a particular
activity, as well as how are their participation complexes and interests balanced.
Social positions and roles detection in multiplex graphs
Can the participation of users in supporting activities be detected analytically? Is
it possible to discriminate between participative actions useful for the community
and those not?
One of the main difficulties on scoring users based on their participation in
supporting activities is to define the problem properly: what we understand by
participation? And, on which supporting activities we want to measure it? An
indirect approach would be to analyze what these supporting activities have
in common, independently of the kind of participation, and find an indirect
measure of the level of participation — social effort.
Previous experiences on open software communities [13] and community net-
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works [P8] teaches us that nowadays the technology is present in most of the
decisions and interactions that occur in the context of these communities of
common-pool resources. As an example, guifi.net uses generic mailing-lists to
coordinate collective actions and specific mailing-lists to discuss regional prob-
lems in their infrastructure. The use of online social platforms or participatory
forums is twofold: (1) the digitalization of the interactions can be stored and
evaluated easily, and (2) the social process driven by the community can be
used to assest the quality of the information [14] and hence, its utility.
Therefore, we mapped the social effort as the influence of users in the overall
ecosystem, measured through their interactions with other users and the utility
of those interactions. According to our model, we modeled these interactions
as a multi-layer graph, where vertices represent users, weighed edges represent
some interaction and each layer represent one of the possible venue where
this interaction might occur (e.g., one mailing-list, a face-to-face meetings).
Our initial analysis of the social structure, based on community detection [P8]
revealed little information about the influence of users across multiple social
venues.
Is it possible to detect social roles and positions in complex graph
structures — like multi-layer or multi-relational graphs — based on
multiplex distance measures? Can any similarity measure being detected?
Roles and positions analysis [15], instead, have been used previously to group
users according their influence in complex graph structures [16]. However,
traditional methods are limited to positions (or roles) based on simple graph
measures, which easily can ignore positions related with multiple layers. In
Chapter 7 and the publications [P6, P7] we develop a new framework for the
detection of social roles and positions for complex graph structures. This frame-
work computes the similarity and dissimilarity among actors using comparisons
between actors and sets of actors instead of just using pairwise comparisons,
which allows us to include multi-layer network measures in the analysis.
Using our developed framework, we introduce some new similarity measures
that might be used to find roles in multi-relational graphs, and discuss how to
measure objectively their level of uncertainty.

Chapter3
Foundations
The work presented in this thesis is supported by background concepts and
theories from different research fields. In this chapter we revisit all of them. We
first define the computer architectures for cooperative applications, emphasizing
the role of community members in the supporting activities. Then, we introduce
the need of implementing regulation mechanisms in distributed architectures
to avoid the tragedy of the commons while encouraging the participation of
users. Finally, we review some basic concepts about the analysis of simple and
complex networks, focusing on the different network models and properties used
or analyzed in this thesis.
This chapters aims to provide a basic background on these topics for non-experts
in information systems, computational analysis or social network analysis.
Experts might skip this chapter and use it as a reference guide, if needed, to
understand other concepts presented on Part II.
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3.1 Computational network architectures for
cooperative applications
The first computational network architecture known for sharing resources dates
back to the later 90’s, when the computational capabilities of personal comput-
ers became insufficient for the research ongoing in academic institutions. As a
solution, in 1994 Foster et.al. [17] created the first network-based computing
architecture, based on the aggregation of distributed resources to perform a
common tasks, later known as grid computing.
The original work on grid architectures focused on creating protocols for
the task execution, synchronizations and resource management [18]. Access
and rights over the use of the infrastructure were controlled off-line, by the
responsibles of the project and later on through a centralized web platform.
The single restriction imposed to the use of the shared infrastructure was due
the technological impediments to perform large batch tasks.
A similar idea of aggregate computational resources was popularized some years
later by telecommunication companies under the name of cloud computing.
Clouds were created with the purpose of provide computational costly services
— not only physical resources — to external users as an integrated service
though the network. The governing model was then monetary, as users pay as
they consume more services and infrastructure.
Two main differences distinguish cloud and grids. Firstly, from the technological
standpoint cloud infrastructures reallocate the tasks and jobs into virtual
environments inside computational devices hosted by the cloud provider [19],
allowing them to maximize the utility of hardware resources. In grid computing,
instead, the jobs are executed on top of the operating system. This was one of
the main reason of its success and economical viability. The second difference
is the change of the sharing model implemented, as in cloud computing the
providers and consumers are two different agents. In the cloud computing
model, users are borrowing services at a market cost, that are held and managed
by someone externally; while in grid computing users are at the same time
consumers and producers.
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3.1.1 Volunteer and contributory computing
Volunteer and contributory computing are two different computational models
for sharing resources and services in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) model. P2P mod-
els [20] are computer distributed architectures traditionally used for sharing
files between geographically disperse users over the network. They are known
for enabling the direct exchange of information between end-users, creating
a new model of computation where users act at the same time as servers —
providing content — and clients — consuming content from other users.
Two of the key challenges in P2P systems have been the self-organization of
the content and its indexing over a large amount of interconnected computer
devices. Overlay networks are an important component to accomplish these
goals. They can be viewed as a virtual topology built on top of the real network,
able to routing messages among nodes efficiently. Overlay networks have been
used since then in multiple distributed systems like volunteer and contributory
architectures.
Volunteer and contributory computing use then similar network architectures,
even if their computational model is different. Volunteer computing [1, 2]
systems are intended for combining dedicated and non-dedicated resources to
perform complex computational tasks. These tasks, are organized into small
jobs — in a similar way as how grid computing divides its tasks into batches —
which are then executed independently in multiple peers’ devices. Contributory
computing [3] instead, divides splits and executes long-lived decentralized
services (e.g., lookup, authentication) and provides an unified framework to
access the platform and run complex tasks on top of them.
In this thesis we will embrace both concepts, volunteer computing and contrib-
utory computing under the definition of cooperative applications because
both systems are aimed to share computational resources using a similar ap-
proach — executing small jobs on P2P network architectures —, although
with different philosophy. In both systems tasks are allocated — in long or
short term — and executed over a set of peers connected though an overlay
network at no apparent cost, giving users a false sensation of unlimited access
to an unbounded amount of resources.
The cooperative model of volunteer and distributed computing is very similar
to the economical model of common-pool resource scenarios, where consumers
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have unlimited access to a set of non-excludable goods — computational
resources in our case — in a competitive environment.
3.1.2 Beyond the computer architecture: communities
Nowadays, most open-source software (OSS) [21] projects have a growing
community of users supporting them. In most cases this is due the lack of
official support, which highlights the need for some forum where users can
share experiences or discuss problems [13]. Additionally, new and easily usable
collaborative and management tools, like distributed version control and web-
based integration systems, are attracting new users with less experience in
OSS that would not participate otherwise. This ecosystem is very similar to
the communities of practice described by Wenger [22, 23], where the social
aim of learning drives the growth of social ties among members interested in a
common shared domain of interest.
Some OSS communities have a regulation system to control the quality of the
software contributed by its members. While some members feel that, in this
context, the mechanism encourages good practices and coding, others feel that
the mechanism is more exclusive than inclusive as it creates a barrier for users’
participation [24].
We believe that in cooperative software applications — like volunteer and
contributory computing — members of the communities of practice can have
a similar role as in open-source software projects governing and ruling the
collaboration process between users implicitly. This scenario will have much
more similitudes with the governing mechanisms observed by Ostrom [6] and
therefore, it will open new opportunities for implementing more inclusive and
fair regulation mechanisms in heterogeneous resource scenarios.
Community networks
Community networks are growing fast as a sustainable model for self-provisioned
computer networking infrastructures [25], alternative to other service offerings.
This has been accelerated by the reduction of the costs of WiFi and optic
networking equipment, combined with the growing popularity of wireless
devices, and the lower complexity of network setup. In recent years, a plethora
of non-profit initiatives have flourished to create community networks providing,
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among other services, Internet access. A few examples are guifi.net [26] and
FunkFeuer [27].
A characteristic of these initiatives is that the network topology grows or-
ganically, without a planned deployment or any consideration other than
connecting devices from new participants or locations by linking them to an
existing one or improving the network service. Typically, the deployment and
management tasks are performed by the community network members, mostly
volunteers [28].
Beyond Internet access provision, the community networks’ physical infrastructure
is sometimes used by some members to provide applications (e.g. web servers,
monitoring systems). As a natural evolution, some community networks are
looking for ways to implement higher level services [29], which would require
mechanisms to regulate and normalize how their members interact with the
computational resources [P3]. The feasibility of implementing such contribu-
tory systems is highly dependent on the network participants’ ability to rank
and evaluate members’ participation.
Community networks are, therefore, an example of common-pool resource [30].
They have a self-provisioned common good shared without barriers among
the participants, while managed and governed by community agreements. We
used guifi.net and other community networks for gathering and analyzing
communities behaviour in a common-pool resource context.
Contributory clouds
During the last decade, a whole series of new computer network architec-
tures have flourished as a cloud solutions for sharing resources incorporating
some principles of the contributory model. One common aspect of these new
architectures is their emphasis on the community aspect.
As an example, Cloud@Home [31, 32, 33] project proposes an architecture to
combine cloud and volunteer computing paradigms. Their model proposes a
federated cloud architecture, composed by a set of autonomous clouds built with
user-contributed resources and with the capability of consuming and lending
resources from and to commercial clouds if needed. Therefore, communities are
defined in their context as a computational and architectural entity — each of
the autonomous clouds —, which have the control over the resources/services
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placed on its devices according to a credit mechanism. The main focus of the
project is, however, to achieve transparent interoperability among the different
autonomous systems.
A similar paradigm, named Community Cloud Computing (C3) [34, 35],
appeared around the same time as a cloud infrastructure “with nodes potentially
fulfilling all roles, consumer, producer, and most importantly coordinator ”. In
contrast with cloud@Home, C3 architectures are based on a distributed model
where shared resources and server functionalities are provided by end-users.
This model can empower small communities of users to deploy their own
community cloud, based in a commons model. Communities are, in the context
of C3 architectures, a social and economic entity which can actively interact
with the shared infrastructure and services.
In practice, and as far as we know, only the Clommunity [36] project imple-
mented some of these ideas. As we said before, the main objective of the
project was running and expanding community-owned networks that provide
community services organized as community clouds.
While the work developed in this thesis can be viewed as a first step to-
wards incentive mechanisms for community cloud computing architectures,
the volunteer and contributory computing models to which it is addressed are
architecturally different. Firstly, our proposal is aimed to share computational
resources instead of virtualized machines or containers, like in cloud computing
architectures. Therefore, other aspects characteristics of cloud systems (e.g.,
VM migration) are not evaluated in this work. In second term, the sharing
model proposed assumed that users participate with cooperative intentions —
sharing resources on short-term — instead of being collaborative — with long-
term common goals. This difference also holds for contributory architectures
as the computational model is based on resources, despite the middleware
manages services.
3.2 Regulation mechanisms
Regulation mechanisms are a fundamental part of any distributed computing
architecture, despite if it implements or not a descentralized model, or if the
governing model is collective or individualist. The human being is selfish by
nature, and hence it needs bounds (e.g., laws and rules) to enforce its behaviour
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in a society. In this section we introduce the need of regulation in cooperative
applications and review how most of the reciprocity-based incentives work.
3.2.1 The tragedy of the commons
Two important characteristics differentiate common goods from other type of
resources: rivalrousness and non-excludability. In economics, rivalrousness is
a property of some goods which states that its consumption — temporal or
definitive — by some individual, precludes its consumption from others. A
good is non-excludable if it is not possible to prevent individuals have not paid
for it to access it. The main problem is that individuals — potential consumers
of the common pool — are aware of the first property (rivalrousness) and try
to take advantage from the second one (non-excludability) without noticing
that, in fact, the common good might not be infinite.
While the access to common goods is unrestricted, users might be tempted to
consume as many resources as they can, following the false idea that it will not
impact negatively to the overall system. Given the rivalrousness of the system,
other users might join them on this strategy until a point of saturation, where
the individuals demand of goods is higher than the overall provision. This
problem was described as the tragedy of the commons by the ecologist Garrett
Hardin [5].
Most of the distributed resource sharing systems presented early on for sharing
resources can be considered a common good. As an example, users in Peer-
to-Peer file-sharing systems compete by the bandwidth capacity, which is a
rivalrousness good — the bandwidth consumed to a user downloading a file
cannot be consumed by anyone else — and non-excludable — once the users
are logged into the Peer-to-Peer system there is not excludability on bandwidth
consumption.
To address the problem, most systems implement explicit governing mechanisms
with a two-fold objective: (1) encourage users to contribute with more resources,
and hence increasing the limit of consumption and (2) regulate how much each
user can consume to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
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3.2.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma framework
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [37] is a well known framework based on game
theory [38] to study the cooperation process between two individuals with
opposed goals but common welfare. The game consists on two players who
must decide individually — and without the possibility to negotiate — to
cooperate (C) or defeat (D) the other co-player. The payoffs for the two actions
are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix of Prisoner’s Game
Player decision Co-player Cooperate Co-player Deflection
Cooperate (a, a) (c, b)
Defection (b, c) (ε, ε)→ 0
The relations between different possible payoffs follow the rule b > a > ε→
0 > c, which immediately poses the dilemma: if cooperation is costly for
the individuals and it benefits only the interaction partners, then Darwinian
selection should favor non-cooperating defectors and eliminate the cooperators.
This leads to a highly inefficient outcome compared to the results obtained by
two cooperators.
We have chosen this game because it captures the relation between the common-
pool and the local decisions taken by users in our scenario. The cooperation
choice (C) represents the willingness of sharing computational resources with
other users, which is rewarded in a competitive way: if the co-player(s) choose
to share resources too the economy of the common pool will be sustainable
and both are rewarded with higher payoffs. Each other choice based on one or
more co-players not contributing will lead to an unsustainable system without
many resources.
3.2.3 Contributory-based incentives
The contributory-based incentives are defined by Rahman et.al. [39] as sharing
strategies that only consider the past contributions performed by the co-player,
when a player has to decide whether to cooperate or defeat with him.
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In the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, a well-known strategy to maximize the payoff
when using this approach is the Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy proposed by
Axelrod et.al [40]. Players using this strategy always start their interaction
with another co-player cooperating with him and, in the following interactions
they replicate the answer of the co-player in the previous round. The success of
BitTorrent protocol [41] is an example of a real application using Tit-For-Tat
as a core strategy. Resulting from that decision, nodes contributing more
resources should receive, in return, a better service than those that contribute
less [9, 42].
However, the study and analysis in [43] shows that forgiveness is a necessary
condition to achieve cooperation. Consider the example of a player that, for
any reason, defeats his co-player one single rounds. If both players are using a
TFT strategy, the next round the co-player will choose to defeat, while the
previous defeating player will cooperate. From then on, players will switch
roles each round between cooperation and defection. Even worst, if by mistake
both players defeat the same round each other, then there is no turn back to a
cooperation situation unless someone makes another mistake. In cooperative
real applications forgiveness is implemented in order to speed-up cooperation
reconstruction after single defections. Most BitTorrent clients use opportunistic
unchoking to compensate nodes’ mutual defection caused when one peer’s
chocking policy replaces one link [44].
3.3 The study of complex networks
It has been shown there are some topological patterns and graph characteristics
promoting cooperation among the nodes in real world networks [45, 11]. This
section provides a brief description of these models and the main characteristics
evaluated during the evaluation of our contributions. For a more complete
description of the content described in this section we refer the reader to [46,
15].
3.3.1 Network models
Different network models have been used during the evaluation of this thesis
to describe social structures (e.g., interactions among members of a commu-
nity) and communication networks (e.g., the overlay topologies used by some
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cooperative applications). Next, there is a summary of the different models
used.
• Torus: An n-dimensional torus is defined as the Cartesian product of n
rings. Symmetric torus networks are built from rings of the same length.
A constraint is that the number of nodes must be Dn, where D is the
number of nodes in the ring.
Under uniform traffic circumstances, torus topologies have the advantage
of providing a balanced use of the network resources. A symmetric torus
improves the mesh by connecting the head node with the tail node in
each row and column. Thus this topology eliminates the edge effect.
• Erdős–Rényi (ER) random graph [47]: is a static random model
where each link has an independent probability of being formed p. There-
fore, in the or G(n, p) model the probability of any node n having k links
is binomial:
P (d(i) = k) =
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k−1 (3.1)
ER random graphs are considered the most simple random probabilistic
networks and are of great interest for comparative analysis.
• Waxman random graph: The Waxman’s probability model for in-
terconnecting nodes [48] was used to build a random network topology
based on ER model, constrain to some 2D lattice L2. Edges are intro-
duced between pairs of nodes i, j with a probability that depends on the
distance between them:
P ({i, j}) = αe
−d(i,j)
βL (3.2)
where d(i, j) is the Euclidean distance from node i to j; α is the probability
of edges between any vertex in the graph and controls the average degree
of the network, β is the ratio between long and short edges and L is the
maximum distance between vertices.
As nodes are distributed uniformly random along the surface, d(u, v) is
our random variable [0, L]. Thus, the Waxman model generates networks
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with lower variability of nodes degree and smaller diameter size than other
Internet topology generators [48]. The model also has an exponential
clustering coefficient distribution, independent of the network size which
is representative of most random graphs.
• Watts–Strogatz (WS) [49] is a random graph model that produces
network topologies with small-world properties by rewiring edges in a
regular ring lattice. Compared with the ER model, the Watts–Strogatz
presents a higher clustering coefficient and a power-law distribution of
nodes degree as opposed as the Poison approximation shown by ER
model. Our interest in this model is to compare how the clustering of
certain nodes might influence the cooperation process.
• Barabási–Albert (BA) model [50]: is a growing random network
based on preferential attachment, which generates network topologies
with a small number of nodes acting as hubs (nodes with larger degree),
while most nodes have a low degree.
According to the incremental growth of the nodes’ power degree, the
network starts with an initial set of m0 connected nodes. Each new
node is connected to m ≤ m0 existing nodes with a probability that
is proportional to the number of links that the existing nodes already
have. Hence, the probability of interconnecting a new node i with node
j belonging to the network — the {i, j} edge probability — is given by:
P ({i, j}) = d(j)∑
j∈V d(j)
(3.3)
where d(j) is the current degree of node j to which node i would be
attached, V is the set of nodes which joined the network. The lower term
is the sum of out-degrees of nodes that previously joined the network.
3.3.2 Properties of networks
Table 3.2 summarizes the main characteristics of the network models that we
discuss during the analysis and evaluation of our mechanisms: degree distribu-
tion, average path length scalability, and clustering coefficient scalability.
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Table 3.2: Properties of network models
Network models Degree distribution ASPL scalability Clustering
Torus constant O(N) O(1)
Erdős–Rényi low variability O(log logN) p
Waxman low variability O(logN) exponential
Watts–Strogatz P (λ, k) limit O(N) independent
Barabási–Albert P (k) ∼ k−3 O(logN) C ∼ N−0.75
• Degree distribution. The degree of a node in a graph is the number
of arcs edges to other nodes. The degree distribution is the probability
distribution of these degrees on the whole topology.
• Average shortest path length. The average shortest path length
(SPL) is the average number of hops between each pair of graph nodes
using their minimum path. The ASPL scalability shows dependency
between the SPL and the network size.
• Clustering coefficient. The local clustering coefficient of a node in
a graph is the proportion of vertices of the node to the number of all
possible vertices. The clustering coefficient distribution is the probability
of these coefficients in the whole network.
3.3.3 Structural analysis
Structural analysis on networks intends to capture and interpret how nodes are
related according to the network topology. When applied to social networks,
structural analysis is able to identify key actors or groups of actors whose
connectivity influences in somehow the dynamics of the system. Three typical
ways of grouping actors based on their connections consist in identifying
communities, positions and roles. While related, these are three distinct types
of groups and they typically require distinct algorithmic treatments.
To briefly recall the difference between community, position and role, we use
Padgett’s social network representing business relationships among Florentine
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Figure 3.1: Padgett’s business family network
families during Renaissance [51] as an example (see Figure 3.1).
As we can observe, a community indicates a cohese group of actors, with many
connections inside the group and fewer relationships with other actors outside
it. For example, the five nodes on the top of the figure form a community
(red area). Roles and positions, instead, focus on the interchangeability of the
actors, and do not require any internal connectivity. In its simplest form, a
position is defined as a group of actors who are similarly connected to other
actors in the network (green nodes). In our example, the families Salvati, Pazzi
and Tornabuon are in the same position, because they are all connected to
the Medici family and to no other family. Roles, instead, refer to actors with
similar patterns of connectivity, independently of the specific actors to whom
they are connected. In our running example, the Barbadori family (yellow
node) has the role of connecting two otherwise disjoint parts of the network.
From this point of view, it does not matter who exactly is connected to them:
if the Barbadori family were connected to Salviati instead of Ginori, it would
still play the same role in the network, but from a different position.
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The methods and tools used to explore these network structures are discussed
in detail in Section 4.
3.3.4 Multiplex network models
In most real systems, actors interact with each other in complicated patterns
that cannot be captured by simple — or monoplex — network models. We
can view such systems as a set of sub-structures — layers — where their
components — actors — are present in one or more of them, and interactions
occur within components of the same or different sub-system.
Multiplex — or multilayer — networks are a mathematical graph structure to
describe such systems. More formally, Kilevä et.al. [52] defined a multiplex
network as a quadruplet M = (VM , EM , V, L), where VM is defined as the set
of possible nodes present in each layer L and EM is defined as a set of pairs
of possible combinations of nodes and layers. That is, EM ⊆ VMxVM where
VM = V xL1x · · ·xLd and d represents the total number of layers.
Figure 3.2 is a representation of a multilayer network with three layers (d = 3)
and six vertices (V = 6, VM = 9). We colored black the edges between vertices
of the same layer — often called intra-edges — and in dashed red lines the
edges between vertices in a different layer — called inter-edges.
Figure 3.2: Multiplex network
As we said, the multiplex networks are good structures to represent complex
relations, but they can be easily used to represent more simple graphs, like
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multi-relational graphs (in this case, each layer will represent one type of
relation and all vertex i will be present on each layer).
We used multiplex graphs in this thesis to relate the activities performed by
users in the common-pool resource with their social activities in multiple social
forums.

Chapter4
Methodologies and methods
This chapter is an accounting of the research methodologies, methods and tools
used during the realization of the present thesis. They are discussed in relation
to the design science model proposed by Peffers et.al. [53] for conducting research
in Information Systems. The main objective is to give both, an assessment of
the quality of the research and a description of those methods and tools that
the reader might not be familiar with.
The first part of the chapter describes the methodologies used to analyze, model
and evaluate each one of the contributions. The second part focuses on describ-
ing the main artifacts used. Some of the artifacts are well established methods
(e.g., the community detection methods), while others are created during the
realization of the present work (e.g., a non-cooperative game simulator based on
discrete events). There are other artifacts not explained in this chapter, which
are considered a — or part of a — contribution and, therefore, are explained
in the corresponding chapter.
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4.1 Methodologies
4.1.1 Data analysis
Wireless community networks — and particularly guifi.net — have been an
important source of information to understand the interactions among commu-
nity members in a common-pool resource [P8]. The analysis of such scenarios
required gathering, modeling and analyzing large sets of traces from different
public and private sources which include: (1) network description files with
topological information, (2) community databases describing the interactions of
users on the community web portal, (3) period infrastructure and networking
logs from computational devices and (4) all messages exchanged between users
on the 43 mailing-lists.
Each of the above sources required different analytical techniques for its analysis,
based on the purpose of the experiment. In addition to the statistical modeling
is worth mentioning fundamental methods of structural analysis (See 4.2.5)
and machine learning (See 4.2.4).
4.1.2 Theoretical modeling
Game theory and mechanism design have been used to model the competi-
tive/cooperation processes occurring on our scenario. Game theory provides a
mathematical framework to describe these processes with functions in terms
of rules, possible strategies and/or outcomes. These representations are not
intended to be a faithful reflection of reality, rather than a model to capture
the main characteristics under the study. Mechanism design, otherwise, intends
to make the inverse process: from a desired outcome and a set of possible
strategies, tries to find a set of rules that impose the outcome no matter which
strategy the actors decide to play — by forcing them to play a specific strategy.
Section 4.2.1 provides the basic description of the game used in the simulations.
Examples of mechanism design and evaluation can be viewed in Chapter 8.
4.1.3 Simulation evaluation
The regulation mechanisms developed in this thesis are intended for regulating
scenarios with several properties typical from complex systems. The resource-
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sharing scenarios are composed by multiple free and non-trivial agents — nodes
and resources —, sometimes interacting through multiple channels at once.
Given the lack of access to a suitable common-pool resource to develop and
implement our mechanisms, we used simulation tools to evaluate our proposals
instead of a theoretical approach.
Naturally, although many of the results presented are supported by theoretical
studies, their whole evaluation is limited to scenarios captured by our simulation
model. The specific details of the computational and simulation models are
described in Section 4.2.
4.1.4 Social network analysis
Social network analysis is considered a series of procedures and methodologies
used to investigating social structures [15]. These structures are usually repre-
sented as graphs where vertices represent actors (e.g., companies, individuals)
and edges represent relations between actors (e.g., friendship). The analytical
methods developed have been used in mathematics and social science, but also
in other research areas — like information systems [54] — where the structure
under analysis can be represented as a network.
In this thesis we have used and contributed with new methods for social
network analysis. Besides the generic methods for graph analysis we focused
on detecting social structures (See Sections 4.2 and Chapter 7).
4.2 Methods and tools
4.2.1 Computational model
The theoretical analysis and simulations presented in this thesis are developed
under several assumptions about the architecture of the nodes, their hardware
resources and the software properties. This unified framework allows us to
compare and combine the different solutions presented in the next chapters
and to generalize most of the proposals.
Our scenarios are composed by a non empty set of N users V = {1, 2, 3 . . . N},
each one contributing with one computing device i (e.g., a handheld, desktop
computer, router) with a fixed amount of resources available to be used by itself
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and other nodes. The nodes can share their resources only with the neighboring
nodes defined by the network topology G = (V,E), where E = V xV is a set
of edges that connect pairs of nodes.
The type of resources to be shared are any type of hardware that can be shared
in a real situation (e.g., CPU, memory, network interfaces). Therefore, the
total amount of resources’ slots available for a device i is represented by the
non empty set Ri = {R1i , R2i , R3i . . . RMi }. A slot is then, the minimum amount
in which a normalized resource Rki can be divided and it will be our unit of
work. While this definition is enough complete to represent any architecture
for cooperative applications, its complexity also makes difficult the analysis
of the results. Hence, unless otherwise noted, for the purpose of this work
we assume that there is only one type of resource to be shared among nodes,
usually noted as Ri. How to generalize our findings to scenarios with more
than one resource is discussed on Chapter 8.
Applications, services or any other software that requires the use of resources
is represented in our model indistinctly as a job. Each job has an associated
minimum cost in terms of a set of resource’ slots W without which the job
cannot be done. The computational model assumes that nodes are able to add
multiple heterogeneous resources from different sources without any penalty to
fulfill the requirements of a job.
4.2.2 Simulation model
Most of the simulations in this thesis were performed with a non-cooperative
game simulator [R12], a tool that allows us to configure a large number of
complex scenarios based on the computational model described above. This
simulator implements an iterative request-response model — similar to other
n-players iterated games —, where nodes manage, ask and share resources
according to our computational model.
While each experiment has its own configuration (e.g., network topology, num-
ber of rounds, nodes’ strategies), the behavior of the nodes is always the same.
At the beginning of each round, nodes are sorted randomly. Then, whenever
a node needs to perform a job — decided with some random probability —,
it first tries to use its own free resources rki to complete it. If the node does
not have enough free resources — meaning that Rki < r
k
min —, then it asks
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its connected nodes for the remaining slots needed to accomplish its job, as
describes the Algorithm 1. Fro now on, we will omit the superscript k as our
simulations only use one type of resource.
Algorithm 1 Requesting procedure
Require: G(V,E) . Network graph
Require: R . Set of resources
Require: i . Requesting node
Require: j . Answering node
Require: rmin . Resource slots needed
1: rii ←min(rmin, Ri.free)
2: if rmin > rii then
3: Xi = brmin − riic
4: for all j | (i, j) ∈ E do
5: requestResources(i, j,Xi)
6: end for
7: end if
According the computational model described, the remaining slots needed Xi
are asked to all neighbour nodes j simultaneously using the auxiliary function
requestResources. As we discuss on Chapter 5 it makes the requesting nodes
more agressive, but in return increases the probability to receive the minimum
needed slots for performing the job. It is a common redundancy strategy in
most computational distributed systems aimed to increase their robustness in
front of node, network or task failures.
As we said, this procedure implements a non-cooperative model — similar to
the Prisoners’ Dilemma — which encourages the self preservation of resources
over the cooperative actions. As the requirements for each potential job are in
first hand supplied by the requester node i, it is probable that future sharing
requests from other nodes will not succeed because nodes does not have much
resources left.
After each node had the chance to start a new job, each of the nodes j who
received a resources’ request need to solve them using the answering procedure
described in Algorithm 2. The procedure starts picking all the requests Xj
received during the given round randomly and, for each of them, it decides to
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cooperate or not with a probability P (lines 2:3). This probability is the result
of playing a contributory strategy (See 3.2.3) or one of the effort strategies
developed in this work (See Chapter 5).
Algorithm 2 Answer procedure
Require: G(V,E) . Network graph
Require: R . Set of resources
Require: i . Requesting node
Require: j . Answering node
Require: rmin . Resource slots needed
1: positiveReplies← 0
2: for all Xj ∈ rand(j.requests) do
3: P ←playStrategy(i, j,Xj)
4: for all x ∈ Xj do
5: if P ≤ U(0, 1) and Rj < positiveReplies+ 1 then
6: positiveReplies← positiveReplies+ 1
7: allocateResource(i, j, x)
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
We want to emphasize that in our simulation model although resources are
requested with the objective of accomplish a particular job, the decision of land
or not those resources are taken slot by slot. It happens because despite that
the probability P is calculated individually for each pair of nodes — taking
into account the overall amount of slots Xj requested — the Cooperate or
Defeat decision is taken for each slot x (lines 4:9), provided that the node
has enough free resources (line 5). This allows us to design mechanisms with
higher granularity, as we will discuss on Chapter 5.
The auxiliary function allocateResource simply allocates resources for a
given job, without running it. Then, if a node has achieved enough slots to
perform the job, these slots will be blocked for the duration of the job. However,
any excess in the lent resources will be released, as describes the Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 3 Confirmation procedure
Require: G(V,E) . Network graph
Require: R . Set of resources
Require: i . Requesting node
Require: j . Answering node
Require: rmin . Resource slots needed
1: rw = rii +
(∑d(i)
j=1 rij
)
2: if rw < rmin then
3: freeResources(rw)
4: return
5: else
6: while rw > rmin do
7: if rii < rmin then
8: j ←rand(j | rij ∈ i.allocated)
9: rij ← rij − 1
10: else
11: rii ← rii − 1
12: end if
13: rw ← rw − 1
14: end while
15: end if
16: executeTask(rw)
17: return
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The confirmation procedure is executed on each node that decided to run a
job the current round, to check if it has received enough resources rmin to
perform the job (line 2). Any exceeding resources allocated are, then, freed
using a random selection process (lines 6:14). Finally, if the allocated resources
r match the requirements for the job W , the auxiliary function executeTask
blocks the resources — reducing the amount of free resources (R.free) — on
all nodes involved in the task for a period of time t, after which the main bucle
will free them.
Notice that this model works under the assumption that users are not perform-
ing more than one task at a given time, which is not what one would expect
in a real scenario. However, this design decision simplifies the analysis of the
results and reduces the simulation time.
4.2.3 Stability of the models
The non-cooperative game simulator described above had been tested during
the analysis of one of the early works [P5], using simple network configurations —
topologies with just 2 or 3 nodes —, where participants had played deterministic
strategies (e.g., answering always positive or negative to other nodes’ requests).
Additionally, the simulator code had been verified during its development using
unit testing and internal assertions.
Each simulation-based evaluation presented in this thesis, with a particular
set of initial parameters, is the result from executing the simulation for 250
rounds, but discarding the first 50 ones. Our early tests had shown that after
50 rounds, the simulations using contributory-based strategies were stable, but
not in equilibrium: despite that the difference between averaged results for the
evaluated variables (e.g., the ratio of cooperators) was less than 1%, nodes
continue changing behaviours. Some simulations up to 10,000 rounds shown
exactly the same behaviour.
In order to avoid random effects caused by the initial configuration of the
simulated scenarios or the random variables used (e.g., the distribution of
resources), each simulation had been repeated by default 100 times — and
occasionally 1,000. Unless otherwise noted, when the results presented in
this thesis as a distribution includes all the individual results in each of the
simulations. In such cases that the results does not include a distribution, they
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are calculated after averaging each of the 100 individual simulations.
4.2.4 Feature selection algorithms
Features selection is an important step when datasets have many variables and
correlated data. For an efficient identification of structures with data mining
techniques, it is needed to evaluate and determine the variables in the data
set that contain valuable information [55]. Determining subsets of a reduced
number of features (e.g., with machine learning techniques) is another way to
identify efficiently properties in data sets.
The feature subset selection in particular is a method for enhancing the perfor-
mance of data mining algorithms by reducing the variables search space [56].
With this analysis we intend to: (1) identify a short list of features to under-
stand resource-sharing processes in collaborative scenarios, and (2) evaluate
each feature algorithmically using some well-known feature ranking algorithms.
Two well-known feature selection algorithms were used at some point: (1)
Correlation-based Features Subset Selection (CFS), an algorithm that evaluates
the feature subsets, and (2) ReliefF, an algorithm that evaluates individual
features. We have chosen these algorithms because they provide reliable feature
sets, they are able to process continuous variables (e.g., ratios representing
successful or unsuccessful process), and they let us understand the resource-
sharing processes. Other algorithms can provide similar or even better results,
but the underlying process is more complex to understand [55]. We briefly
review these algorithms below.
• Correlation-based Features Subset Selection (CFS) [57]: CFS
evaluates the usefulness of a subset of features by considering the indi-
vidual predictive capability of each feature, along with their degree of
redundancy. The algorithm selects subsets of features that are highly
correlated with the class, but having low correlation between them.
• ReliefF [58]: This algorithm evaluates the usefulness of a feature by
repeatedly sampling an instance and considering the value of the given
feature for the nearest instance of the same and different classes. We have
chosen it because it is noise-tolerant and unaffected by feature interaction.
However, ReliefF searches for all the relevant features, even if they are
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redundant. This algorithm assigns a “relevance” weight to each feature.
In our analysis, we selected features with a relevance ranking above 0.
Instead of implementing these algorithms, for the analysis and evaluation of
this thesis we used the Weka machine learning framework [59], which provided
the implementation of these algorithms.
4.2.5 Community detection algorithms
Social relations in a group of participants can form a community if they are
more willing to interact among them than with other members of the network.
This is a well-known phenomena — called communities structure — that
arises in most complex networks. The community’s size, structure or even
members’ interactions outside and inside the communities are a good source of
information to study the roles of the network users.
The community detection problem has been studied for a long time, and there
are different algorithms and methods that can be applied, depending on the
properties of the network and the properties of the targeted communities. In
this thesis we apply two different methods, the clique percolation method and
the Louvain method to detect two different community structures, and discuss
the differences and the role of their members.
In practical terms, the difference is that while the percolation method is
based on the detection and aggregation of k-clique disjoints sets inside the
graph — which will have maximum connectivity among their members —, the
Louvain method is an optimized algorithm to find partitions providing that the
modularity (the relationship between average degrees inside the community
and intra communities) is minimized.
• Clique percolation method [60]: The clique percolation method is
based on the detection and aggregation of k-clique disjoints sets inside
the graph, which will have maximum connectivity among their members.
As the optimization is done locally, some members could be part of more
than one community. Additionally, communities sub-graph are disjoint.
• Louvain method [61]: The Louvain method is an optimized algorithm
to find partitions of large scale networks very fast, providing that the
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modularity (the relationship between average degrees inside the com-
munity and intra communities) is minimized. As a result, we have a
graph partition where all nodes are forced to belong to one and only one
community.
4.2.6 Centrality measures
Centrality measures aim to identify the most important vertices in a network.
The list of all possible centrality measures is too long to reproduce it below.
However, next we provide the definitions of those centrality measures used in
this work.
• Closeness centrality: Closeness centrality for a connected graph is
defined as the inverse of the average distance to all other nodes (defined
by their shortest path).
• HITS [62]: HITS is a ranking algorithm used in the past to exploit the
web’s hyperlink structure. As a result, it obtains two measures for each
node, the authority and hubs. The first one is a measure of individuals as
a source of information, while the second one ranks higher those nodes
with high quality out-links.
4.2.7 Blockmodeling
Blockmodleing is an analysis method to reduce a large network to a smaller
comprehensible structure. More specifically, according to Doreian [63], “block-
modeling tools were developed to partition network actors (units) into clusters,
called positions, and, at the same time, to partition the set of ties into blocks
that are defined by the positions”.
Therefore, the objective of blockmodeling is to group or cluster the actors
of a network by some meaningful definition of equivalence. As an example,
structural equivalence [64] states that two nodes i and j are equivalent if they
are both connected or not to the same other actors in the network, one by one.
Then, the relations within actors in each cluster are used to build a simplified
network graph, which is usually easier to analyze. Figure 3.2 shows an example
extracted from [65].
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Figure 4.1: Blockmodeling example
Blockmodeling methods can be divided into two main categories according
their criterion function: indirect and direct approaches. In the former ones, the
measure of equivalence is a pre-condition, used to compute the similarity and
dissimilarity of actors. Blocks are built then, using regular clustering methods.
In direct approaches, on the other hand, the whole set of possible blocks —
clusters — is tested against a set of perfect pattern of connections (equivalence).
The uncertainty inherent in the indirect methods is compensated by the human
interaction, as usually indirect approaches are supervised methods. It reduces
the search space of solutions and the computation time.
Part II
Contributions
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Chapter5
Effort-based incentives for resource
sharing in cooperative applications
The effectiveness of volunteer computing paradigm depends on the collaboration
attitude adopted by the participating users. Unfortunately for system designers
it is not clear how to contribute with local resources to the shared environment
without compromising resources that could then be required by the contributors.
Therefore, many users or applications adopt a conservative position based on a
direct reciprocity of actions (See Chapter 3).
This position limits the ability to compete for users with fewer physical resources
despite their willingness and effort, while leads to an underutilization of the
users’ local resources reducing the efficiency of the ecosystem. In this chapter
we address both problems by introducing a new reciprocal incentive mecha-
nism based on participatory economic principles. The study discusses concrete
implementations, which are analyzed in computing environments with both,
abundance and scarcity of resources; and with perfect and imperfect information.
The obtained results show how our mechanism is able to increase the overall
balance of tasks executed without jeopardizing the availability of local resources.
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5.1 Introduction
Volunteer and contributory computing are just two examples of the new
emerging paradigms towards the future Internet, where communities of users
aggregate their non-dedicated resources in a collaborative ecosystem. These
paradigms have been used to support several types of applications, such as
crowd-sensing [66, 67], mobile collaboration [68, 69] and grid computing [70,
71].
These computing paradigms typically involve a networked and distributed
environment, through which heterogeneous devices share part of their resources
(e.g., CPU or memory) to help other participants to perform certain jobs [1, 2,
72, 73] or running services [74, 75]. Although these applications are most often
centrally managed, there are proposals that follow a distributed approach [76],
with characteristics similar to Peer-to-Peer systems in which participants are
both consumers and resource providers acting on their own interests.
Therefore, counting on a free and unrestricted access to the shared resources,
without the need to contribute to the environment would probably lead to
the collapse of the environment. We previously described this problem in
Chapter 3 as the tragedy of the commons. Many previous proposals use
reciprocal incentive mechanisms to promote collaboration among users, and
thus dealing with the stated problem. These incentives regulate the global and
individual benefits, by encouraging nodes to collaborate, granting them a fair
return for their contributions.
Some research works argue that nodes contributing with more resources should
receive in return a better service than those that contribute less [9, 42]. Hence,
traditional methods typically use absolute metrics of contribution to determine
what is a fair return and then, when a resource can be shared with other
peers. While this approach is simple and efficient in most cases, it has been
demonstrated that in heterogeneous scenarios typically discriminates nodes
with few resources and does not provide a fair scenario for sharing resources [P2].
In this chapter we present a set of reciprocal incentive mechanisms for en-
couraging the exchange of resources in a highly heterogeneous scenario. The
mechanisms are based on the proposal of [39] that uses participatory economic
principles [7] for measuring the fair return of resources. In particular we are
interested on implementing policies that compensate the effort or sacrifice, by
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measuring nodes’ contributions as a ratio between the shared resources and
the resources the node owns.
Therefore, the main contribution of this chapter is the introduction of a
novel reciprocal incentive mechanism based on effort measurements
of nodes contribution. The selected mechanism is the result of fine-tunning
five different strategies based on the same concept of effort described early
one. In order to determine the impact of using each strategy we performed
several simulations that considered collaboration environments with abundance
and scarcity of resources. The obtained results show that the effort-based
incentives allow participants to accomplish at least the same number of jobs
as when contribution-based incentives are used. Moreover, in the first case the
nodes having few resources are not discriminated by the rest of participants,
resulting thus in a more robust and fair collaboration process. Several features
of the collaboration process are analyzed and discussed in this chapter in order
to demonstrate that these findings are not by chance.
The next section presents the related work. Section 5.3 details the sharing
strategies evaluated in this study. Section 5.4 shows and discuss the obtained
results. Section 5.5 explores practical implementation issues and Section 5.6
presents the conclusions and the future work.
5.2 Related work
Incentive mechanisms for promoting cooperation have been studied on Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) resource sharing and volunteer computing scenarios in order to
convey selfishness behaviors from both: a theoretical and practical point of
view. Theoretical approaches address the cooperation problem through game
theory, typically using some variation of the prisoner’s dilemma game [37]; e.g.,
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In the case of repeated encounters among
nodes (i.e., potential collaborators), positive interaction is very important for
obtaining sustainable cooperation among participants [77].
The theoretical models have helped designers understand what properties must
hold such incentive mechanisms to fairly allocate heterogeneous resources in a
cooperative way. Two properties are especially desirable in the design of the
node cooperation strategy; incentive-compatibility and envy-freeness, to impose
a notion of fairness on the outcomes of every action made by the nodes. The
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first property means that players cannot improve their utility by lying about
its resources. The second one indicates that players cannot prefer to use the
resources of a particular participant. In [78] the authors established that at least
one mechanism exists that holds both properties for agents with heterogeneous
capacities, if there are only two kinds of shared goods or if the individual goods’
values are binary. Another approach for providing fairness of effort-based
strategies was proposed by Santos et. al. [79] who proposed the Quid Pro Quo
(QPQ) mechanism to assign tasks on a self-organized and distributed scenario.
QPQ also holds the envy-freeness property and the incentive-compatibility.
However, as the previous theoretical models, it implicitly assumes that each
participant scrupulously follows the specification of these mechanisms.
The practical approaches to address fair cooperation are mainly based on the
proposal of BitTorrent [80]; a popular P2P protocol for file distribution. A
key for the BitTorrent success lies in its Tit-For-Tat strategy, a reciprocity
based mechanism, which works reasonably well to foster cooperation among
downloading peers. In this scenario, some studies argue that nodes contributing
more resources should receive in return better service than those that contribute
less [9, 42]. These contribution-based mechanisms are simple and efficient
in most cases; however they are unfair [81, 82], because some nodes end up
contributing much more than they download.
In [9] the authors present a general heterogeneous model to evaluate the tradeoff
between performance and fairness in BitTorrent systems. This work shows that
the current protocol used in BitTorrent is only one of many possible solutions;
in this case, the fairness metric is used to indicate incentive compatibility. The
work also proposes three rate assignment strategies to optimize respectively
one of the following variables: average downloading time, perfect fairness
or max-min allocation. They also present a simple design knob that helps
designers analyze the possible tradeoffs (in terms of performance) that the
use of a certain rate assignment strategy has on the collaboration space. The
performance is quantified in terms of both, average downloading time and
fairness. A performance evaluation is finally conducted to show the merits and
properties of BitTorrent-like protocols.
Similarly, the proposal in [83] focuses on the performance analysis of different
policies using Tit-For-Tat. These authors introduce a model that characterizes
the relationship between a peer’s performance and the design parameters of
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the BitTorrent protocol. These parameters determine the effectiveness of the
incentive mechanism for the nodes. This model is then used to determine how
the incentive mechanism can be adjusted to enhance reciprocity or reduce
inequity in the collaboration scenario. However, it has been demonstrated
that when we apply contribution-based mechanisms in heterogeneous scenarios,
the nodes tend to share and cooperate only between equals – in terms of
resources [84]. Hence, nodes with scarce resources suffer discrimination because
they do not have enough resources to contribute. While these works focus on
a particular strategy, we analyze the performance of different collaboration
incentives from a higher level.
Recently, a new practical scenario, named private BitTorrent communities,
has appeared [85]. Such a proposal aims to motivate the resource uploading
in P2P networks. Community administrators specify a minimum uploading
threshold that must be addressed by the community members. In this way,
it is guaranteed that each peer provides a certain level of contribution to the
community. This mechanism, known as Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE), is
very effective in increasing supply [86]. However, [87] show that SRE has two
undesired negative effects: (1) peers are forced to seed for long times and (2)
SRE discriminates against peers with low bandwidth capacity.
Although most of the BitTorrent incentives are contribution based, Rahman et
al. [39] show that these systems can also be used with effort-based incentives.
The use of such a strategy showed a greater utilization of the available resources
and a reduction of the download times in slow peers.
In this work we apply the concept of effort-based in a different architecture,
aimed for distributed computing instead of file-sharing. It means that the
shared resources are not being transfered between users, only occupied — and
blocked — for a fixed time. In bitTorrent applications, however, the files
are transfered among users and the heterogeneous resources — bandwidth
capabilities — are limited by both, the sender and the receiver.
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5.3 System Model
5.3.1 Modeling Resources and Nodes Behavior
All the experiments performed in this chapter follow the computational and
simulation model described early in Section 4.2. In this particular case, the
resource requirements to perform a given job are randomly determined using a
discrete normal distribution, originally with a mean of six slots and a variance
of two slots — truncated to a minimum of one slot.
The number of rounds nodes need to perform every job is also randomly
determined using a discrete uniform probability distribution, with a minimum
value of one and a maximum of three rounds.
5.3.2 Resource Sharing Strategies
The request-response model implemented could be viewed as any iterative
two-players game in the literature, like the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this
game, two players are involved in a potential collaboration process choosing be-
tween cooperation and defection. The decision to choose one action or another
can be based on the trust in others and their reciprocity. The consequences of
the participants’ choices have a different impact on the global community and
also on their own probability to obtain resources from other nodes.
This study evaluates these impacts when the decision is based on two ap-
proaches: contribution-based and effort-based collaboration strategies. Next,
we briefly describe the concrete implementation of the collaboration strategies
used in these experiments, that we have used as a baseline.
• Contribution-based Incentive: This approach is implemented follow-
ing the simple Tit-For-Tat strategy: a certain node i always responds
to each slot request of a node j by making the same decision (i.e.,
cooperation or defection) made by j during the last request from i.
• Contribution-based Incentive with Forgiveness: To avoid the in-
finite cycle of mutual defection problem inherent in the TFT incentives,
we decided to implement a second version where participants forgive a
neighbor after a fixed number consecutive defeats. Particularly, when a
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node j has defeated node i during a consecutive number of rounds, the
node i considers it as an unknown node.
We defined the Effort-based Incentive as a reciprocity incentive mechanisms
that measure the relative contribution between nodes. In the simplest form, in
this strategy the node contribution is defined as the percentage of available
resources that a node shares with others. Hence, in our implementation a
certain node i responds to the request of a node j, assigning to each requested
slot a probability of cooperation P . The probability P is calculated as the
ratio between the amount of slots that j shared with i in the last request, and
the total amount of slots that j owns. That is:
P (W, t) =
rji(t−1)
Rj
(5.1)
where W is the number of slots required for some job. Symbols t and t−1
stands for the current and last interaction between nodes i and j.
The metric is inspired by the work of Rahman et al. [39] in which authors
rank and prioritize BitTorrent chunk requests from another peer, by using
the percentage of bandwidth devoted to the other participant during a slicing
windows of time. We adapted such proposal because in our scenario each
slot is not transferable — in contrast of a BitTorrent schema where chunks
(equivalent to our resource slots), could be obtained from multiple sources —.
Hence, we have used jobs’ slots instead of bandwidth to calculate the ratio
between shared resources and the total amount of resources. In our strategy
the ratio represents as a probability to cooperate instead of a ranking metric
and the slicing window is just one interaction round.
The strategy implementation, however, assumes that nodes’ effort have to be
computed with high granularity — slots — instead of jobs. System designers
could be tempted to simplify the metric to compute just jobs instead. Next
strategies are variants of the first one to explore these effects.
• Task Effort-based Incentive (one-by-one): This variation of the
Effort-incentive measures contributions at job level, instead of CPU slot.
It was inspired by the work of Santos et al. [79], where the authors discuss
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— evaluating complete jobs instead of slots — how the granularity of
their incentive affects the performance of the sharing strategy. In this
case, the probability P is now calculated as the ratio between the mutual
accepted jobs and the maximum of expected jobs that j could run. The
mutual accepted jobs represents the sum of jobs that j accepted during
last round from both node i and internal requests. The maximum of
expected jobs is the number of j slots divided by the simulation average
cost of jobs (in slots). That is:
P (W, t) =
Wji(t−1) +Wjj(t−1)
Rj (mod T )
(5.2)
where T represents the average number of slots in the simulation.
Note that in this strategy we included the equivalent effort devoted to
nodes themselves in the calculation of the mutual accepted jobs. It
increases the diversity of probabilities P , avoids binary evaluations, and
aims to maintain a reciprocity policy.
• Task Effort-based Incentive (local): This variation instead of evalu-
ating just the effort perceived by a particular node, evaluates the effort
noticed by a sub-network cluster. Hence, the probability P is calculated
as the ratio between the amount of jobs that j accepted from its neighbors
and the maximum expected jobs.
P (W, t) =
neigh(i)∑
j=1
Wji(t−1)
Rj (mod T )
(5.3)
As a consequence, the direct reciprocity between requester node and
the requested cannot be assured, only the local one. The implemented
strategy is a variation from the Task Effort-based (one-by-one) strategy,
inspired by some ideas from network exchange theory [88]. This theory
discusses, among other things, how the participants’ outcome can be
partly rooted in the structure of a (social) network, because they hold
pivotal positions on the network, or in other case they are in a dependent
position for responding to a request.
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All unknown nodes, or those who have not met before (e.g., during the first
round of the simulation), cooperates with a 50% probability.
5.3.3 Collaboration Scenarios
To study the impact of the proposed incentives, we consider two types of
collaboration scenarios. In scarcity scenarios, the amount of resources available
is — in average — twice the amount requested per node and round. Instead,
in resource abundance scenarios, the available resources are four times the
requested amount of resources.
Given the maximum amount of simultaneous jobs, the probability of having all
resources occupied during a round is lower than 2% for an abundance scenario,
and to 7% for a scarcity one.
5.3.4 Metrics
The simulation results were assessed using several metrics.
• Node Cooperation Coefficient: This metric is calculated as the ratio
between the amount of requested slots by some node and the number of
positive answers — slots — obtained during the simulation, regardless if
the lent slots were used or not. It is, therefore a direct measure of the
nodes’ willingness to collaborate with each other.
• Node Success Percentage (NSP): This value is the ratio between the
number of jobs that a given node wants to perform during an experiment,
and the number of completed ones. Therefore, it is a measure of the
nodes’ satisfaction.
• Envy-fairness: For a given node i with d(i) neighbors, the envy-fairness
metric is calculated as the difference between the success percentage
of node i (NSPi) and the average node success percentage of its d(i)
neighbors. Hence, it is a comparative measure of how envious a node is,
considering its neighbors’ jobs success. It is commonly referred as node
success correlation.
Notice that this metric pretends to measure a deviation of NSP between
a node and its closed neighbors, rather than a property of the incentive
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mechanism — like envy-free —. However, we claim that while a positive
envy-fairness of a single node does not imply envy-freeness, a negative one
implies that the incentive mechanism will not be envy-free. In addition,
all nodes using an incentive mechanism that is envy-free will have a
non-negative envy-freeness by definition.
• Tasks Fully Satisfied: This value represents the ratio between the
number of jobs that all nodes want to perform during an experiment, and
the number of jobs effectively completed. Therefore, it is a measure of
how many jobs get the amount of resources needed for their completion
(which takes into consideration the temporal status of the nodes too).
• Utilization of CPU slots: We have here several sub-metrics related
to the utilization of resources. The amount of used slots represents how
many nodes assign to their own jobs. The shared slots indicates the slots
devoted by a node to jobs of other nodes, and the number of free slots
represents the slots that are not used. Finally, the requested slots show
the amount of slots that nodes intend to obtain from other nodes.
The first three were measured directly on each participating node, and the last
two considered the whole network.
5.4 Experimental results
In this section we provide a complete analysis of the experimental results to
understand the impact of each incentive strategy (described in Section 6.4.2)
in every collaborative scenario (i.e., in resource scarcity and abundance).
According our models we considered only static network topologies — small-
world or torus — with 125 nodes and heterogeneous resources distribution.
As an overview, Figure 5.1 shows the average cooperation coefficient — round
by round — for contribution-based and effort-based strategies. We can see
that all our mechanisms obtain more collaboration instances than the baseline
ones. Otherwise noted simulations considered a resource scarcity scenario with
a torus topology.
Focusing on the contributory-based incentives, we can see that, as we predicted,
without forgiveness (i.e., replying strictly and reciprocally) all nodes start to
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Figure 5.1: Average cooperation coefficient per round
reject requests of other nodes after the first 50 rounds. When a forgiveness
variant is applied instead, the nodes are able to recover from this situation and
cooperate between 17% and 11% of the time, depending on how many rounds
they wait to forgive.
The remaining chapter will focus on determining if these initial findings can
also be found in other collaboration scenarios and what are the consequences
of using effort-based incentives instead of contributory-based on them.
5.4.1 Analysis of the Cooperation Coefficient
Figure 5.2 presents information about how heterogeneous is the cooperation
coefficient of node in several scenarios — combining different topologies and
resource availability. It shows high variations in the minimum and average
values in all type of incentive, suggesting an explanation for the swings between
periods with high and low cooperation shown before.
The results indicate that in all scenarios and topologies, the effort-based incen-
tives obtain a higher cooperation level than those implementing contribution-
based incentives. In our simulation, the reduction of 50% of available resources
— from abundance to scarcity scenarios — represented a significant reduction
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Figure 5.2: Cooperation Coefficient for torus and small-world networks
of positive responses; over 8%. According to that observation, in scenar-
ios where nodes use effort-based incentives are more interested in
cooperation than scenarios where the contribution-based incentives
are implemented. However, it is also important to remember that the
cooperation effort measures just a willingness, and not a tangible result.
5.4.2 Analysis of the Node Success
In cooperative applications, the effort is a measure, but not the objective. If
an increment on cooperation does not imply a large number of jobs done, there
would be no impact on users’ satisfaction. Similar to that shown in Figure 5.2,
Figure 5.3 shows the average, minimum and maximum values of the NSP.
These results support our initial hypothesis that a participative measure of
users contribution will lead to a higher cooperation, and therefore
to a higher users’ satisfaction. This is a tendency observed by the average
NSP, which is 6% over the satisfaction when nodes use a contribution-based
strategy.
Node Success Percentage and Cooperation Coefficient show that effort-based
incentives measuring slots reaches the best scores in almost any
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Figure 5.3: Node Success Percentage for torus and small-world networks
scenario. The key element that allows us to understand this result is the
granularity of the shared resources. While in the slot effort-based incentive
every slot is requested and shared individually, in task effort-based incentives
the requested or shared resources are those needed to accomplish the job (i.e.,
blocks with a variable number of slots are requested and shared among nodes
as a single unit). This imposes additional restrictions to the collaboration
process. Therefore, the collaboration process supported by effort-based
strategies will be more effective and useful, when the resource being
requested and shared is smaller.
Figure 5.4 an Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) plot for
the NSP obtained by each participating nodes, with scarcity and abundance
of resources, connected through a torus topology. We can see that nodes
using effort-based strategies are involved in a fairer collaboration process; any
percentile of population has higher NSP values, despite both kind of strategies
accomplish the same number of jobs.
Evaluating the differences between both collaboration scenarios, Figure 5.4
shows that the total amount of available resources has a significant impact
on the node success distribution. In scarcity scenarios approximately 60% of
nodes have an NSP below 25% using effort-based strategies, while it drops to
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5% when contribution-based strategy is used.
Figure 5.4: CDF of Node Success Percentage in scenarios with resource scarcity
(dashed line) and abundance (continuous line)
In abundance scenarios, however, there are almost no small NSP values. The
percentage of jobs accomplished by each node, instead, are distributed very
uneven with most of the nodes close to a 40% of jobs succeeded. This behavior
of the cooperation process, particularly the stationary values, can be explained
by the phenomenon of networks undergoing a phase transition. A Barabási
study [89] describes this phenomenon, and shows that it is a common behavior
pattern that appears when the network nodes are “socially related”.
This phenomenon means that when a given threshold — called the tipping
point — is reached, all the network nodes undergo a transition phase and
they start acting as a single entity. In a previous study the authors shown
that this effect appears when the nodes use a contribution-based strategy [P2];
however, Figure 5.4 also shows this phenomenon when the nodes use effort-
based strategies. In terms of cooperation among nodes, this figure confirms
the previous results.
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5.4.3 Analysis of the Impact on the Node Properties
Considering the previous results, we have to determine if the differences of
performance between the collaboration strategies used in this study change
with the node properties. The previous results show important differences
between the maximum and minimum values of the NSP. This suggests that
there exist node conditions or topological properties that help some nodes to
achieve a better satisfaction than others.
The results shown until now discard the network as an explanation, since the
torus topology shows almost the same behavior as the small-world1. Thereafter,
we conducted an additional simulation to measure the individual satisfaction
of the nodes. Figure 5.5 shows the NSP achieved by each node according to
their total amount of CPU slots, in a scarcity and abundance scenario. The
experiment involved a small-world topology and 125 nodes.
(a) Scarcity scenario (b) Abundance scenario
Figure 5.5: NSP vs. Resources per node (R)
The results for scarcity scenarios show two different behaviors; one for nodes
that have more than 8 resource slots, and another for nodes that have 8
or fewer slots. In the first case it does not matter what strategy they play,
because both strategies achieve similar NSP values. However, when nodes have
few slots, the contribution-based strategy is unfavorable. Contrarily, when
using an effort-based strategy, the success percentage is between 3% and 70%.
This shows that the effort-based strategies are fairer than contribution-
based strategies, when they are used in cooperative scenarios with
1It is, however, a side effect of the topology’s size, which is very small to have any effect.
This and other topological related issues are the topic of Chapter 6.
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heterogeneous participants (in terms of resources).
Although in resource abundance scenarios the results follow the same behavioral
pattern as in scarcity scenarios, the nodes with more resources (i.e., large nodes)
behave differently. In abundance scenarios the NSP of these nodes show a
low dispersion, which means that they are almost self-sufficient; therefore,
these nodes provide and request few slots to the environment jeopardizing the
collaboration process and the task accomplishment in small nodes.
5.4.4 Analysis of the Envy-fairness
The Figure 5.6 shows the CDF plot according to the envy-fairness value
recorded by the network nodes, and where all collaboration strategies show
approximately 60% of nodes with negative — but small — values of envy-
fairness caused by both, the strategies played by nodes and how we modeled
the process.
Figure 5.6: Envy-fairness in a resource scarcity scenario with torus topology
Analyzing the baseline strategies we can see small variations in terms of envy-
fairness. This means that despite some nodes are not satisfied with their utility
— when compared with their neighborhood — there is no higher inequality in
the system. This result is not surprising, because the Tit-For-Tat strategy
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generates stronger cooperation dependence among nodes.
Effort-based strategies, instead, cause higher inequalities in favor of
nodes with less resource slots as we can observe in Figure 5.7, where the
envy-fairness value achieved by each node is shown. Nodes with less than 8
slots are more likely to have positive values in detriment of more powerful
nodes; opposite as happens with contributory-based incentives.
Figure 5.7: Envy-fairness vs. resource per node (R) in a resource scarcity
scenario
The inequalities of resources distribution are an unwanted result from the
strategy design point of view. Nodes with negative envy-fairness will surely
complain about their status and would change their strategy if it would be
possible. This effect is more noticeable in effort-based strategies — specially
in those using jobs as a metric — due the higher values of some nodes’ envy-
fairness compared with the negative ones.
5.4.5 Analysis of the Resources Utilization
Another feature of the system that must be studied is the resource utilization.
This metric provides an additional perspective of the fairness and effectiveness
of the collaboration process. Figure 5.8 shows a histogram with the average
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distribution of resource slots in the six scenarios, using a torus topology. Four
metrics are utilized to understand the resource utilization: used, shared, free
and requested slots.
In resource scarcity scenarios, the results show that nodes using an effort-
based strategy dedicate at least the same slots to jobs belonging
to other nodes as the slots assigned to local jobs. The granularity of
the measurement does not change this behavior. However, as we anticipated
while measuring efforts at lower level — slots —, nodes tend to increase their
solidarity towards other nodes, increasing the amount of resources used in
proportion.
Furthermore, these results help us to understand the collaboration process
embedded in scenarios with contribution-based incentives. It is our under-
standing that the eventual defection of some nodes causes an increment of free
resources that nodes can devote to themselves, which as consequence causes
more defections. At the end, each node into the system turns into self-provision,
reducing the collaboration and efficiency (e.g., in scarcity scenarios there are
about the double of free resources).
When node efforts are measured using slots, instead, nodes tend to increase
their solidarity towards other nodes. This solidarity helps other nodes in
getting all the required resources for their jobs, turning the competition on
cooperation, making the resource sharing process easier, and thus increasing
the NSP and the system utilization. These situations do not occur when a
contribution-based strategy is used by the nodes.
In resource abundance scenarios, the cooperation improvement from
effort to contributive strategies is smaller, and it also leads to a reduction of
resources that nodes use for themselves. However, it never turns the system
to a point of solidarity, nor even neutrality. This is an important
observation about the scenario, as highlights the importance of studying how
increase the available resources if needed; which we address in Chapter 6.
Finally, is noticeable that in all cases there is a high number of slots
underused by nodes, which could contribute to increasing the value of the
satisfied tasks metric. This side effect occurs because all strategies consider in
their decisions only the previous relationship between the nodes. Any other
factors, such as resource usage, energy consumption, continuous defection from
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Figure 5.8: Histograms of average CPU slots requested, own, shared and free
on different scenarios involving a torus topology
same neighbors or equitability, are not considered at this time.
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5.5 Designing Effort-based Systems
The previous results allow us to understand the impact produced by the use of
a particular collaboration strategy in a volunteer computing scenario. In this
section we address some practical issues of the proposed incentives to guide
mechanism designers.
5.5.1 Mixing Contribution-Based Strategies and Slot Effort-
Based Incentives
One of the problems pointed early (See Section 5.4.4) was the undesired
inequality of envy-fairness. We argued that a strategy enforcement through the
mechanism design would avoid the strategy switching, as it happens in common-
pool resources — where mechanisms and governing policies are enforced by the
community. However, in most volunteer computing scenarios system designers
cannot guarantee that all nodes will use some particular collaboration strategy.
Therefore, it is also important to understand the behavior of the cooperation
coefficient when we have heterogeneity of collaboration strategies in the envi-
ronment. Although that study is part of the future work, this section presents
some preliminary results.
Figure 5.9 shows the cooperation coefficient and NSP when the collaboration
environment involves different percentages of nodes playing contribution-based
and slot effort-based strategies. For example, 40% / 60% means that 40% of
nodes are playing the former one and 60% are playing the other one. These
results indicate that the minimal and average value of NSP tends to improve
with the percentage of nodes playing an effort-based strategy. Particularly, the
collaboration environment shows two different behaviors depending on whether
the percentage of the nodes playing effort-based strategies is below or over
60%. If the percentage of nodes playing the effort-based incentive is at least
60% — indicated in Figure 5.9 as 40% / 60% or higher —, the cooperation
coefficient and the NSP tend to be similar. In addition, these values are always
over the same metrics but for the other observed segment.
Although these results are still preliminary, they indicate that if the
cooperative computing environment allows the use of heterogeneous
strategies, the system designer should try to ensure that the environ-
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Figure 5.9: Cooperation coefficient and NSP mixing collaboration strategies
ment keeps at least 60% of nodes playing a slot effort-based strategy.
That percentage seems to be the minimal threshold to ensure a good level
of cooperation among nodes and also fairness of the cooperative computing
environment. In a common-pool resources community, it also gives an idea
about how much social pressure a misbehaving node could hold.
5.5.2 Analysis of Uncertainty on Effort-based Incentives
In practical terms, one limitation of effort-based strategies is that participants
must somehow know the maximum number of slots — Rj — or jobs — Rj
(mod T ) — that other participants can perform in order to evaluate their effort
ratio. Two basic approaches can be used to address this issue:
• Direct or indirect measuring. This approach requires installing a
specific program on peer computers to measure and report their maximum
capabilities. However, this is costly in terms of processing time; therefore
most systems use indirect measures to infer the capabilities of other
nodes. The main problem with using inference is that such a process
could be inaccurate [90], and therefore the system could promote the use
of incentive mechanisms that are not suitable for such a scenario.
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• Node self-reporting. In this technique, the nodes announce their
maximum capabilities each time they make a new request for slots or
jobs. Honesty is a key aspect here. Nodes with many resources could try
to trick the incentive mechanism, announcing less resources than what
they actually have, making the effort evaluation higher.
Cooperation coefficient and nodes’ success percentage for effort-based strategies
with a percentage of uncertainty — from 5% to 20%— in the measure are shown
in Figure 5.10. By analyzing these results we can see small variations caused
by the incorrect measure of nodes’ maximum resources; making no difference in
nodes’ willingness to collaborate and the success of the collaboration process.
Figure 5.10: Results of study of uncertainty in the estimation of number of
slots
The malicious behavior of some nodes, when they self-report their own limits,
can be analyzed using the results shown as the NSP reported in Figure 5.11
and the envy-fairness of liar and trustworthy nodes in Table 5.1. During the
experiment, we selected a percentage of nodes — from 5% to 20% —, named
liars, which report less than their maximum CPU slots — from 1 to 3 in scarcity
scenarios and from 1 to 6 in abundance — in order to be better evaluated by
their partners.
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Figure 5.11: Node success percentage for trustworthy and liar nodes
Even if the liar nodes gain a better reputation during the first rounds, the
results in Figure 5.11 show that there is no advantage for lying instead of
truly reporting the node’s maximum resources. Although there is a small
advantage to liar nodes when they are a clear minority, it decreases — until
disappearing — when the percentage of liar nodes increases. When the number
of liar nodes increase significantly (e.g., above 20%) both type of nodes have
the same envy-fairness.
Table 5.1: Envy-fairness of trustworthy and liar nodes
Strategy
Co-player Cooperate Co-player Deflection
Min Max Avg Min Max Avg
Slot Effort-based -0.43 0.63 0.00 - - -
Slot-Effort based - 5% -0.50 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.56
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5.5.3 Jobs management
Some results from Section 5.4 pointed out that most nodes are poorly evaluated
by its peers due an increment of their requests, while the number affirmative
answers they got has not changed. Additionally, we found that the experiments’
design choices caused that all strategies — including contributive-based ones —
have envy-fairness inequality.
This experiment has been designed to test what happen when the amount of
slots requested during the experiment decreases. We can do that in two forms:
1. Decreasing nodes’ aggressiveness: During the simulation, nodes are
considered to be in two different states: active — meaning that the node
has an own task running by himself — and waiting — when all own
tasks has been finished. Each round, nodes that are in waiting status
may decide to start a new own job with a default probability of 50%.
We reduced this probability by half (25%).
2. Increasing jobs’ duration: Each job performed in the simulation has
a uniform distributed random duration from 1 to 3 rounds. When a node
has an own job running, is on active state and hence, he is not requesting
for new jobs to its neighbors. We increased such duration by a factor of
2 (from 1 to 6 rounds).
Interestingly, Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show that increasing the duration of
the jobs has no effect on the nodes’ cooperation willingness. As a consequence,
in both scenarios the average utility — NSP — remains equal.
On the other hand, a decrease of nodes’ aggressiveness — by requesting tasks
less frequently — has a negative effect, specially on scarcity scenarios. As
nodes have more resources available, because there are less requests for sharing,
when they want to perform a job is more likely to use their own resources than
others. We have seen this effect before, when we discussed the behavior of
Contributory-based strategy without forgiveness. As a final remark that would
need further study, we can observe in Figure 5.13 that Contributory-based
strategy without forgiveness is not influenced by jobs aggressively in abundance
scenarios.
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Figure 5.12: Cooperation Coefficient and NSP in a resource scarcity scenario
Figure 5.13: Cooperation Coefficient and NSP in as resource abundance
scenario
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigate how to encourage the exchange of resources
in highly heterogeneous volunteer and contributory computing scenarios by
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providing a set of new reciprocal incentive mechanisms. The mechanisms
are based on participatory economics principles to compensate the effort or
sacrifice, by measuring nodes contributions as a ratio between the shared
resources and the total amount own.
The analysis and comparisons presented in this chapter provides evidence, based
on simulations, indicating that it is possible to generously share resources with
others without putting at risk the local resources using effort-based incentives.
As a consequence, nodes showed a higher willingness to collaborate regardless
of the amount of resources that they have, increasing the global ratio of tasks
successfully finished. Furthermore, it avoids the tendency of cooperating only
within nodes with the same amount of resources shown by nodes using a
contribution-based strategy.
Looking at the results, we can conclude that the most benefited users from
our proposal are the participants with scarce resources. It increases the envy-
fairness of powerful nodes — thus, increasing the global envy-freeness — despite
they are also benefited from the increase in cooperation willingness.
From the system designer point of view, we have evaluated the impact of
envy-fairness when different strategies can be used, discussed the consequences
of the uncertainty on the measurement or nodes’ reporting of resources and
the impact of several requesting policies. While the mechanism is far to be
complete designed, the experimental results will be of great use for future
works.
Summarizing, effort-based incentives are good strategies to be used in volunteer
and contributive computing, since they help nodes with scarce resources to
improve their satisfaction without harming powerful devices. However, it
generates a feeling of envy among large contributors. Evaluating nodes’ effort
or sacrifice in terms of number of jobs will further improve the number of
satisfied tasks per node at expenses of generating even more inequity.
Chapter6
Compensating locality impact on
resource-sharing scenarios
Despite the cooperation willingness shown by the participants on a volunteer or
contributory computing scenario, the resulting outcome may be highly limited
by the amount of resources they have to access. In cooperative applications,
where resources are accessed only among pairs of nodes directly connected, the
topological properties and nodes placement will influence the overall outcome
of the shared environment. Hence, adding extra resources without taking into
account their locality and accessibility will limit the desired impact.
In this chapter we first explore how much the global and local properties of
networks affect the collaborative process after adding new resources into the
system. The study outcomes indicate there is a short list of computing and
network variables affecting positively or negatively the collaboration capability
of the devices with less resources in such a heterogeneous scenario. Then, based
on the lessons learned, we propose a heuristic to place extra resources in order
to maximize the cooperation level in terms of resource sharing.
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6.1 Introduction
Given their nature, the exchange of resources in distributed computing archi-
tectures — like volunteer and contributory computing — happens between
users or devices directly connected to each other through an overlay network.
As a result, collaborative applications must be designed to assure that any lack
of resources can always be supplied by borrowing them from their neighbors.
Therefore, mechanisms — like incentive strategies — are designed to guarantee
the supply of resources locally rather than globally. Some of the results shown
in Chapter 5 suggest that, as a consequence, the local optimizations cause an
inefficient use of resources in the absence of other regulation mechanisms.
To solve the problem, most BitTorrent clients use opportunistic unchoking
to compensate neighbors’ noncooperation or lack of resources to dynamically
modify their links [44], seeking to be connected to nodes with higher capabili-
ties. However, in scenarios with insufficient global resources the continuous
reallocation of nodes and jobs in the topology will not only not solve the
problem, but also will lead to more inefficient systems.
One example of such scenarios are computer-supported mobile collaboration.
This collaboration architecture involves nomad users with mobile devices and
a software system to perform on-demand interactions [91]. For instance, the
interactions among medical personnel at a hospital [92] or the incidents discus-
sion conducted by construction inspectors after reviewing building facilities [68].
Typically small devices (e.g. cellphones) are well prepared to support tasks
involving high mobility [93]; however they are the most critical resource in
these scenarios.
Alternatively, we propose combining traditional-resource computing paradigms [17,
19, 18] (e.g., cloud or grid computing) with the collaborative applications to
create a decentralized collaboration network [94], where powerful devices can
share part of their hardware resources (e.g. processing power) during small
periods of time in exchange for a retribution afterwards.
The resulting architecture would potentially have an increased heterogeneity,
as cloud and grid computers have larger amount of resources compared with
personal computers or cellphones devices. Hence, the location and distribution
of these new resources will be crucial in order to improve both, the initial
cooperation between devices, and the overall jobs successfully done. To that
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end, overlay topologies would play an important role.
After demonstrating the negative and positive effects of different network
structures in the previous chapter, in this chapter we analyze how the locality
of devices — their placement inside the network, compared with the other device
— can improve or hinder the collaborative process. The main contribution of
this chapter is the description of a new heuristic to distribute resources
and allocate their host nodes to cover the demands from powerless
nodes. The proposed heuristic will place devices with scarce resources in
positions with easy access to the extra resources added, based on distance-
based and local measurements.
Next section describes the problem to address and the research questions of
this study. Section 6.3 presents the related work. Section 6.4 describes the
experimentation setting. Section 6.5 introduces the hotspot placing algorithm
proposed. Section 6.6 presents the obtained results and its discussion. Sec-
tion 6.7 provides guidelines to deal with resource-sharing issues affecting the
collaboration process. Finally, Section 6.8 presents the conclusions.
6.2 Motivation and problem definition
Finite resources and its heterogeneous distribution reduce the collaboration
willingness of participants with less resources. In the previous chapter we have
shown that this problem arises because small nodes — in terms of resources —
cannot contribute with the same amount of resources to their neighbours.
As an example, consider a resource-sharing architecture with two types of
nodes, regular and powerful ; the former ones having about five times less
resources than the later ones. Using the simplest version of a contributory-
based incentive — that is, the Tif-for-Tat model described in Chapter 4 — we
expect powerful nodes act as self-served, leaving the regular nodes few chances
of cooperation.
For the sake of the demonstration, lets change the simulation model allowing
nodes answer affirmatively as many slots requests as they want; without taking
into account their resource limits. If then, we measure the nodes’ average
willingness of cooperate we expect the cooperation coefficient be raised close
to the 100%; but not the nodes’ success percentage, as the computation model
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prevents nodes for using more resources than they really have.
Figure 6.1 shows the results from this experiment, indicating that a hidden
effect prevents nodes from achieving the expected cooperation. The simulation
include 1000 nodes arranged according different topologies, being 60% of them
regular devices and the rest powerful ones and average of 6 neighbors per node.
Figure 6.1: Cooperation coefficient of regular and powerful devices with
limit/unlimited neighbor resources.
These results show that introducing powerful devices to the network and adding
some limitations that did not originally exist in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
have a considerable impact on simulation results. In spite of having several
regular devices willing to cooperate, many of them finally do not share their
resources due to the limited number of available resources’ slots.
More importantly, the variation of cooperation for regular and powerful devices
between the limited and unlimited scenario is different for the four topologies,
indicating that their connectivity influences the network process. These are
statistically significant differences between the means determined by a one-way
analysis of variance, ANOVA (F (3, 996) = 2.614, P = 6.45e−25). Thus, these
observations can be taken as valid.
In the results section we describe in detail why this collaboration process
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happens (See Section 6.6), and how we can take advantage of the underlaying
reason to increase the number of success jobs performed by regular nodes (See
Section 6.7).
6.3 Related work
Resource placement is typically a problem that tries to approximate the overall
goal (performance or cost improvement), the workload and the target system.
It is a NP-hard problem [95, 96], so it usually require some heuristics to find
the approximate solutions within a feasible time. The first heuristic comes from
the well-known uncapacited facility location problem [96], a widely studied
quadratic assignment problem, where n facilities are assigned onto n sites, so
that the average transportation cost between sites is minimized.
A well-known application domain of resource placement is the Web. There are
numerous approaches for placing Web servers or Web proxies in a way that
the performance is optimized [97, 98, 99]. The placement algorithms applied
in all these cases use a global knowledge about the topology of the network
and about the client requests.
Other approaches are presented in the domains of service grids [100, 101] and
service overlay networks [102]. These systems also assume a global view of the
network and some centralized management entity.
Finally, we also can find the same problem in a new area: service placement
in intelligent environments (AmI). In [103] the authors propose a fully de-
centralized, dynamic, and adaptive algorithm for service placement in AmI
environments. This algorithm achieves a coordinated global placement pattern
that minimizes the communication costs without any central controller. Our
work is different from this one in some aspects. A first difference is that in our
solution every node can offer and request resources, whereas in the previous
work the service follow a client-server architecture. Another difference is the
use of the positioning element. In our case it is a generic resource and any
node can offer it, whereas in the previous paper each client has to use a specific
service.
Several approaches have been used to study the impact of overlay network
topologies on the cooperation process; for example to analyze the topology
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properties in real-world applications with a good cooperation level. In that
sense, Iamnitchi et al. have studied the patterns and properties of network
topologies in file sharing applications [45], and Lozano et al. have studied them
on email systems [11]. The topologies used in our study are based on these
last two works.
A final approach was proposed by Nowak [8] who studied the properties of
the topology for encouraging cooperation in the area of games theory. In
his inspiring paper Nowak presents some mechanisms for the evolution of
cooperation and simple rules specifying how natural selection can lead to
cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. These rules have inspired our
working hypothesis.
Studies by Cassar [10], Santos et al. [12] and Lozano et al. [11] also show the
potential impact of the network topology on the cooperation process. Our study
basically differs from these previous ones because we model the heterogeneity
and limitations of computing devices. This study also takes into account the
overlay network characteristics (e.g. the clustering coefficient and the degree
distribution) and the placement of devices within the network.
Like these related works, we have limited the study to the ideal environment
for the nodes’ behavior. We then do not take into account other computational
effects or drawbacks like load and task balancing or allocation. We do not take
the nodes’ mobility into account either, but we consider changes in the network
topology. Simulating mobility of real-world nodes is a complex task [104],
which should be addressed once the effect produced by the other network
features has been understood. This study used data mining techniques to
understand the process of collaboration among nodes and even to predict it.
6.4 System model
All experiments of this study were done with our network simulator following
the same computational and simulation model described early on. Each
experiment included simulations performed over a discrete scenario with 250
rounds, discarding the first 50 ones in order to avoid the transitory shown in
Chapter 5.
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6.4.1 Modeling Resources and Nodes Behavior
In these experiments, each computing device is modeled as being of one of
two types: (1) regular: handhelds or similar computational nodes with few
resources, and (2) powerful: laptops/desktop PCs or similar computational
nodes with a larger amount of resources.
These devices were modeled as having only one type of resource to share and
use (e.g., CPU cycles, memory, storage). We have set a ratio of 1:5 between
the resources capabilities of this kind of devices. Consequently, we consider
small devices — those initially forming the system — ones having up to 3 slots
to use or share, while powerful ones — those introduced by system designers
to supply the extra demand of jobs — will have up to 15 resource slots.
Finally, the maximum number of resources requested (Wmax) was set to 10
and the maximum time execution needed for each job was established in 3
rounds.
6.4.2 Resource Sharing Strategies
These simulations were designed to asset the impact of topological-related
decisions on resource-sharing scenarios, despite the particular collaborative
process taking account. Therefore, we assumed that all participants have a
simple sharing strategy — without need to further incentives to prevent free-
riders or other malfunctioning behaviors —. As an example, in common-pool
resource communities we can assume that nodes — users — complain with
the incentive mechanism due some social pressure. The sharing strategy has
been modeled using a contributory-based strategy — Tit-for-Tat — without
forgiveness.
The simplicity of the model, however, made easier to generalize the experimental
results and to integrate our placement algorithm on more complex scenarios
as well as with the other effort-based mechanisms presented in this work (See
Chapter 8).
6.4.3 Metrics
The simulation results were assessed using some of the metrics presented early
on in Chapter 5 or a variation of them, like the node reciprocity coefficient or
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the node failure percentage. In their description, nodes and devices are used
indistinctly as one node only represents a single device, and a device can only
be attached to a single node.
• Node Cooperation Coefficient: This metric is calculated as the ratio
between the amount of requested slots by some node and the number of
positive answers — slots — obtained during the simulation, regardless if
the lent slots were used or not. It is, therefore a direct measure of the
nodes’ willingness to collaborate with each other.
• Node Reciprocity Coefficient: This metric describes how much a
node i is willing to cooperate with one of its neighbors j. It is based on the
same principles as the Node Cooperation Coefficient — is calculated as
the ratio between the amount of requested slots by i to j and the number
of positive answers obtained from j during the simulation, regardless if
the lent slots were used or not.
• Node Success Percentage (NSP): This value is the ratio between the
number of jobs that a given node wants to perform during an experiment,
and the number of completed ones. Therefore, it is a measure of the
nodes’ satisfaction.
• Node Failure Percentage (NFP): This value is the complementary
of the NSP, and represents the ratio between tried and failed jobs during
an experiment. The sum of both percentages, NSP and NFP, is one.
6.5 Hotspot Device Placement Algorithm
The placement algorithm has been designed for cooperative applications running
on top of physical resource-sharing architectures, typically decentralized —
without a central decision-entity — based on the observations described in
Section 6.6:
1. It is important to maximize the number of links between heterogeneous
nodes — hosting powerful and regular devices.
2. Devices with fewer capabilities — in terms of physical resources — have
to be placed within the network topology in positions — vertices of the
graph — with higher degree.
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While the first observation imposes equal constrains for regular and powerful
nodes, the second one describes a clear placement for regular ones.
In [98], the authors propose several heuristics to place resources in decentralized
computing architectures. They characterize those heuristics by their metric
scope — the nodes, resources and links that are considered when placing the
devices — and the approximation method — the particular technique used to
make the placement decisions.
The inherent decentralization and scalability that characterizes our scenarios,
force us to consider heuristics that can be independently executed by every
single participant. Therefore, we limited the metric scope of our solution to
the information that one single participant has or can get very easily by just
asking its neighbors. However, our ranking uses the knowledge about the
overlay topology to compute the cost impact of placing one device on one
specific location for all possible combinations (within the metric scope). These
costs are then sorted, and the best one that does not violate any constraints is
selected.
The ranking function of a location i in the topology can be defined as:
Ri(G) = dc(i)
neigh(i)∑
j=1
d(j) (6.1)
where dc(i) is the degree coefficient of the location or vertex i and d(j) the
degree of their neighbor j.
To guarantee that participants with fewer resources are not clustered together,
if multiple vertices with higher ranking are directly connected our placement
Algorithm 4 attempts to place first powerful devices close to critical positions,
where their impact on the efficiency of the neighboring regular devices will be
higher.
6.6 Experimental results
In this section we analyze the impact of increasing the resources heterogeneity
on collaborative scenarios based on the overlay network topology by introducing
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Algorithm 4 Powerful nodes’ placement
Require: G(V,E) . Network graph
Require: S . Number of powerful devices to place
1: rankedPositions← null
2: for all i ∈ V do
3: rankedPositions[i]←R(i, G.neigh(i))
4: end for
5:
6: counter ← 0
7: for all position ∈ SORT(rankedPositions) do
8: if counter < S then
9: G[position].type←R(POWERFUL)
10: else
11: G[position].type←R(SMALL)
12: end if
13: counter ← counter + 1
14: end for
15: return G
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extra resources. We firstly study the impact of adding powerful devices to a
lower-resources scenario. Then, assuming that we found an optimal ratio, we
further investigate the effects of topology in such scenario.
6.6.1 Analysis of nodes distribution
The bar plot (See Figure 6.2) describes quantitative the cooperation willingness
of small participants in several resource-sharing scenarios after introducing
new nodes with higher amount of resources. This result, has implications for
distributing resources and selecting the most suitable network topology.
The resource distribution is represented in the x-axis (See Figure 6.2) as the
ratio between regular and powerful nodes. For example, the first dataset was
obtained with a network of 1000 nodes that had 20% of regular nodes and
80% of powerful.
Figure 6.2: Cooperation coefficient of regular devices using four network
topologies and several ratios of powerful nodes
We observe minor variations in the maximum cooperation coefficient due
both, the addition of new resources and the overlay topological properties.
However, Figure 6.2 shows how a small increment of resources in the scenario
— from 0% to 20% — will increase the average cooperation coefficient in the
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regular nodes around 32%. These results confirm our hypothesis, showing
that the introduction of external resources improves the level of
cooperation among regular nodes. Most importantly, the scenario is
benefited independently of the topological properties of the overlay network.
Increasing the ratio of powerful nodes from 20% until 60% will not affect the
average cooperation, but it gradually increases the minimum cooperation until
reaching the 43%. Adding more powerful resources beyond this point, however,
does not grant any significant advantage to the regular nodes; but it will
certainly increase the deployment costs.
These results show it is possible to improve the cooperation coefficient of the
handhelds in a resource-sharing scenario with scarce resources by introducing
new ones in the network. We used standard statistical methods to compute the
confidence interval and margin of error [105] of the values. The standard error
of the mean values is at most 0.055. The relative margin of error for the mean
is at most 12.02% for a 95% confidence level. Thus, we can consider the average
values computed on this test set as valid. The ANOVA (F (4, 366) = 2.396,
P = 2.49E−60) confirmed the significance of these findings.
6.6.2 Analysis of resources’ distribution
Analyzing participants cooperation comparing different resources’ distribution
allows us to gain insight into the importance of locality. Consider, as an
example, the introduction of a single node holding all the extra computational
resources; instead of distributing them into several nodes. From the economic
point of view this would be cheaper, but only few nodes would be benefited
from the extra resources. Therefore, we are interested on finding, if any, a
ratio of resources per node that guarantees the maximum cooperation profit.
Figure 6.3 shows the evolution of the cooperation coefficient in a Waxman
network (see Section 3.3.1) when the amount of new resources is constant,
but the distribution among the nodes changes from an initial ratio of 3% of
new devices — with 112-128 extra resource slots each — to 33% — with 7-8
resource slots.
It is important to notice that there exists a local optimal distribution of
resources among the newly introduced nodes, that obtains a maxi-
mum cooperation coefficient — from 20% to 27% depending of the metric
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Figure 6.3: Cooperation Coefficient (Av, Min) of regular devices vs resources
distribution ratio among powerful nodes
used (i.e. the average or the minimum values). The same experiment, repeated
in other network models shown smaller cooperation differences, but maintains
the maximum peak around the same ratios.
6.6.3 Cooperation reciprocity
Figure 6.4 shows the reciprocity coefficient between each pair of devices (x-axis
represents the requesting node i and y-axis the responding node j) in a scale
from 0 to 10000 where the stronger colors represents the higher values in a
simulation using a Barabási–Albert network. Values below 0 represents nodes
not connected among them by the topology.
As nodes have been ordered according to their node success percentage, we
can easily observe that nodes with a higher cooperation —- on the right
side of the matrix –– do not correspond with the nodes that have higher
reciprocity coefficient. In other words, there is not a relation between how
well a node is treated by their peers — the reciprocity — and the
percentage of tasks he is able to finish at the end of the simulation;
which would be the expected result if participants are using a Tit-for-Tat
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strategy. As a consequence, there should exist other better criteria
(in terms of reciprocity and fairness) to place each device.
Figure 6.4: Reciprocity coefficient matrix ordered by cooperation coefficient
According to Figure 6.4, we can also observe that powerful devices are only
focused on collaborating with a few number of neighbors between all the
possible ones within the spectrum. To better understand this phenomena we
need first to understand the role of the topology in the collaboration schema.
6.6.4 Impact of the network topology
In order to understand the effects of the network model, we are going to start
reviewing the results presented earlier in this section regarding the impact
of introducing powerful devices in a resource scarcity scenario; but from the
topological point of view. The simulation included 1000 nodes — 60% of them
regular and 40% powerful — arranged in different networks, all of them with
an average degree of 6 neighbors.
Our measurement function is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
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the requests failure percentage of regular devices — those with few resources
—. This CDF value represents the percentage of participants that keep a certain
defection level when trying to collaborate with their neighbors. The x-axis
in Figure 6.5 represents the percentage of requests that failed because the
potential collaborator had no available resource slots for sharing.
The simulation results using a Torus overlay topology show that all the partic-
ipants have at least 40% of jobs failed because the lack of resources, while 60%
of them only have a large NFP — around 78% or less —. Other networks, like
Waxman, in which nodes are allowed to have different topological properties,
shown a wider range of jobs’ failures. It decreases the ratio of failed jobs
for some portion of the nodes by depriving some participants to perform any
task; like we observe in static random models like Erdős–Rényi and Waxman
networks, where between the 29% and 18% of the nodes cannot perform any
task.
Figure 6.5: CDF of the failure percentage of regular nodes.
Participants distributed in topologies with a power law degree distri-
bution and a smoother clustering coefficient (like Barabási–Albert
models) have similar success and failure percentages as the ones par-
ticipating in a Torus network. Furthermore, while its minimum failure
percentage is not as good as the one observed on Waxman topologies, most
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of their members below the 60th percentile have lower failure per-
centages than Torus networks, while the difference for the top 20th
percentile is not as large.
6.6.5 Impact of the network size
Most of the results presented in the previous and present chapters where
analyzed in networks with an arbitrary number of nodes. However, we just
show that the dynamics of the network may influence the cooperation between
its members. One main cause can be the size of the network.
Our first hypothesis was that if a node only interacts with its neighbors, mod-
ifying the network size without changing the average nodes degree — hence,
altering only the clustering coefficient — should not change the nodes’ coopera-
tion response.
However, the analysis of the cooperation coefficient for regular nodes in several
random networks with different sizes (See Figure 6.6) demonstrated that
there exists a propagation effect between nodes that modifies their behavior
proportional with the network size. While small networks assure a large
percentage of satisfied jobs, nodes devices in large scenarios increase
significantly their node success percentage; demonstrating that our
initial hypothesis was false.
If we now look at how resources are used by both types of devices (See Figure 6.7)
in a small and large network with 125 and 1000 members respectively, we can
observe that in the smaller network, both types of devices tries to get the
fairest compensation for the shared resources because the Tit-for-Tat game
strategy. As we have seen on Chapter 5, that is impossible for the regular
nodes because they do not have enough resources compared with the powerful
ones.
However, when we increase the network size, devices with larger
amount of resources are more willing to share their resources, ded-
icating less resources to their own tasks. That benefits indirectly the
devices with few resources, because now they have more chances to cooperate
and share their resources. As a consequence, regular nodes also devote
less resources to their own jobs.
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Figure 6.6: CDF vs. Node success percentage of handheld devices.
It’s important to notice that in scenarios based on larger overlay networks,
both types of devices tend to request less resources, as their probability of
being not performing own jobs is higher than before.
6.6.6 Impact of the nodes’ degree
If the resources needed for a given job cannot be obtained from the device
itself, must be borrowed from their directly connected neighbors. Therefore,
devices with higher degree would potentially have access to more resources,
and will get a higher success percentage.
Figure 6.8 shows the node success percentage of several large networks — with
5000 nodes each — with 60% of powerful nodes. Two average values for
the network degree were used: 15 and 35. The results show that for each
tested topology large clustering coefficients provide more collaboration
opportunities and improve the overall satisfaction of the participants
in terms of NSP.
The results also highlights some other consequences of the collaborative dynamic
implemented. Networks with larger nodes’ average degree contribute to trigger
the “networks undergo phase transition” pointed in the analysis of the scenario
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Figure 6.7: Histograms of average CPU slots requested, used, shared and free
on Waxman topologies.
(See Section 5.4.2), creating more clear divisions between highly successful
nodes and those participants with a 50% success rate (Specially in the NSP
range from 50% to 83%). Although being something positive, it also contributes
to increase the envy-fairness of the architecture.
6.6.7 Impact of other components
Understanding the collaborative process requires identifying if there exist
any correlation between different features — the network properties analyzed
and other components of the architecture. We have followed the steps and
recommendations presented in [56] to choose the appropriate feature set and
analyze it. Although there are techniques and algorithms to construct this
feature set, we have created a set of “ad hoc” features because the data domain
is already known to us.
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Figure 6.8: CDF vs. node success percentage of handheld devices.
• Topological features is the dataset that extends the previous topolog-
ical properties studied. It includes (1.1) the network topology (torus,
Waxman, Erdős–Rényi and Barabási–Albert models), (1.2) the network
size in terms of number of nodes, (1.3) the local density of the nodes
(Clustering coefficient) embedded in the network, (1.4) the nodes’degree
of each node and (1.5) the sum of each Neighbors’ degree at one hop.
• Device features is the dataset that represents the network participants
and their behavior. It includes (2.1) the amount of available resources
for each device, (2.2) the device type (powerful or regular), (2.3) the
number of rounds in which a user has requested resources to other nodes
and (2.4) the number of requested resources per job.
• Proximity features represent the relationship among nodes in the
dataset. It includes some network distance metrics such as (3.1) the
number of powerful nodes at one hop, (3.2) the total amount of Neighbors’
resources per node at one hop and (3.3) the sum of Two-hops neighbors’
resources from each node.
Note there are a couple of features that have higher correlation (i.e. similarity)
between them. In that case it is enough for this analysis to use one of them.
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For example we have not used the device type feature because it provides
information similar to resources. In this case, we have chosen resources because
it has a numeric value for the analysis. Likewise, we have used rounds instead
of the requested resources feature.
We classified the datasets into four groups to show the relevance of the topology.
Table 6.1 shows the results (i.e. the selected and ordered features) after applying
the CFS and ReliefF algorithms to all datasets. We have used ten-fold cross
validation in the evaluation of the features selection process [106]. For the
CFS algorithm, we reported the number of times that a feature was selected in
the ten-fold cross validation. For ReliefF algorithm, we reported the average
relevance of the ten relevancies from the cross validation (selected features had
a relevance ranking above 0).
Both algorithms selected the rounds (2.3) feature as relevant for almost every
dataset. Notice the CFS algorithm does not select features with high correlation
(e.g., it selects only the most relevant one between powerful (3.1) and Neighbors’
resources (3.2). Therefore the set of features selected by CFS tends to be
minimal. However the ReliefF algorithm selects all relevant features, even if
there is similarity among them.
A first analysis of these results indicates that the cooperation coeffi-
cient in torus and Waxman topologies depends mainly on proximity
features due the lack of topological differences in the former one and the lower
variation in the later. In Erdős–Rényi and Barabási–Albert topologies,
however, the nodes behavior depends on network topological fea-
tures. More specifically the cooperation coefficient depends on the clustering
coefficient.
The set of relevant features obtained by both algorithms seems to be similar,
but it cannot be clearly seen by just analyzing Table 6.1. In order to check
such hypothesis, we re-processed the results obtained by the ReliefF algorithm
applying Principal Component Analysis (PCA) transformations [106]. After
applying the PCA transformations the obtained results indicate that the
relevant features selected by both algorithms are similar, and they correspond
to mainly those identified by CFS.
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Table 6.1: Selected and ranked features by topology
Features
CFS
Torus Waxman Power law Small-world
1.3 Clustering coef. 10/10 10/10
2.1 Resources 10/10
2.3 Rounds 10/10 10/10 10/10 10/10
3.1 Powerful 10/10 10/10 10/10
3.2 Neighbor CPUs 10/10
3.3 2-hops neig. CPUs 10/10
Features
ReliefF
Torus Waxman Erdős–Rényi Barabási–Albert
1.2 Network size 0.001 0.001 0.002
1.3 Clustering coef. 0.002 0.001 0.004
1.4 Degree 0.009 0.007 0.002
2.1 Powerful 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.017
2.3 Rounds 0.001 0.001
3.2 Neighbor CPUs 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.015
3.3 2-hops neig. CPUs 0.002 0.003
6.7 Improving nodes’ placement
Previous results (See Chapter 5) have proved that devices with scarce resources
are not as competitive in collaborative scenarios as devices with larger amount
of resources. In Section 6.6 we analyzed some of the elements that influence —
positively and negatively — such cooperation.
Some of the elements like the properties held by the overlay networks supporting
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the collaboration process, its size or the average degree cannot be modified in
practice, because they are the result of the dynamic of the system under analysis
or some external factors [R2]. Consider, as an example, the connectivity of
several geographical towns using wireless technologies. In this scenario, the
physical placement of the devices will be constrained to the geography; which
will impose the network model and the optimal overlay.
Instead, the features selection analysis showed us that there are other properties
— mainly related with the locality of the nodes in the topology — that could be
easily controlled in order to increase the cooperation chances of regular devices.
I our previous example, while we cannot control the underlaying topology, it
would be possible to designate in which nodes we want to place more hardware
— powerful devices — so that we compensate the lack of resources in regular
nodes.
6.7.1 Using feature selection
The results obtained up to this point allow us to state that topological and
proximity features are the most influential on the cooperation process. We
tried to use this information to achieve an optimal network operation, by
distributing the regular nodes according some topological properties but the
results (See Table 6.2) shown no significant differences between the methods.
Since the cooperation coefficient is not sensitive to the analyzed parameters, it
is our hypothesis that besides the proximity features studied there exists another
necessary structural property that triggers the collaboration of regular nodes.
In order to find it, we reviewed the experiments done so far using the most
promising topological model; the Small-world networks.
A close observation of the results revealed that when regular nodes are placed
following a degree procedure some of them end up surrounded only by de-
vices of the same type. As result, these nodes have no access to the extra
resources introduced in the network, and hence their cooperation drops. Com-
paring the cooperation coefficient on different placements, we have detected
higher reciprocity between heterogeneous devices than among ho-
mogeneous. A logical reason for that phenomenon is that the introduction of
powerful nodes mainly improves the cooperation of nodes directly sharing or
getting resources from them. In our model these interactions are only allowed
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Table 6.2: Cooperation coefficient of regular devices for various device place-
ment strategies
Topology Small nodes placed on
Cooperation Coefficient
Min Max Avg
Power-law
Clustering 39.89% 100.00% 79.93%
Lower degree 40.76% 100.00% 74.25%
Higher degree 37.79% 100.00% 80.91%
Randomly 26.99% 100.00% 78.55%
Small-world
Higher clust. 49.40% 100.00% 81.67%
Lower clust. 48.48% 100.00% 81.12%
Higher degree 50.00% 100.00% 81.42%
Randomly 47.78% 100.00% 80.77%
Lower degree 39.11% 100.00% 80.40%
Random
Randomly 34.59% 100.00% 81.69%
Clustering 39.89% 100.00% 79.93%
between participants directly connected to each other and, hence, the impact
of powerful devices is mainly noticed when connected devices are of different
type.
6.7.2 Using the Hotspot Algorithm
Using the feature selection for improving the nodes cooperation achieved by
modifying limited nodes placement through the network ranking parameters
(e.g. clustering coefficient and nodes degree) has been unsuccessful and not
conclusive. However, the above experiments helped us to observe two conditions
— necessary and sufficient — that, given our simulation model, and a hotspot
placement problem; will improve the percentage of jobs done in the scenario.
1. It is important to maximize the number of links between heterogeneous
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nodes — regular and powerful devices.
2. Nodes with fewer capabilities — in terms of physical resources — have to
be placed within the network topology in positions with higher degree.
As we explained, the strategy of the algorithm consists on deploying first the
powerful devices in positions of none interest for the limited ones; while keeping
empty vertices for placing the devices with fewer resources.
Figure 6.9 compares the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the limited
devices’ success percentage on the same random network composed by 1000
nodes with an average degree of 30 and only 20% of powerful nodes. Each line
corresponds to two different placement strategies: random and our hotspot
algorithm (degree based).
Figure 6.9: CDF of node success percentage random and hotspot placement
strategies.
The nodes placement algorithm presented in Section 6.5 guarantees a sub-
optimal distribution of powerful nodes, while increases the degree of nodes with
less resources. As a result, it increases the cooperation among heterogeneous
devices and the overall node success percentage.
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Table 6.3: Cooperation coefficient of regular devices (Average, Percentage over
80% of cooperation) for random and hotspot placements in two network graphs
of different sizes.
Topology Nodes Av. degree
Random placement Our placement
Avg > 80% Avg > 80%
Waxman
100 6 44.47% 14.63% 53.30% 20.00%
100 30 73.73% 55.26% 73.03% 55.00%
1000 30 68.65% 44.94% 72.73% 50.50%
Barabási–Albert
100 6 45.15% 8.43% 53.31% 22.50%
100 30 76.54% 63.29% 76.00% 60.61%
1000 30 75.24% 56.77% 77.69% 62.75%
The results for different network models and properties are illustrated in Ta-
ble 6.9. The NSP improvement using our hotspot algorithm is similar while
comparing sparse networks with similar properties (e.g., 8.83% in Waxman,
8.16% Small-world, with 100 nodes and 3 average degree). In networks with
higher density (e.g., with only 100 nodes and an average degree of 30 nodes)
both placement strategies generates similar number of links between homoge-
neous devices, and hence there is not a real improvement while our hotspot
algorithm is used.
6.8 Conclusions
A number of issues related to the potential capabilities and limitations of
devices with less resources in a collaborative application are understandable
based on the simulation results shown in this chapter.
We have demonstrated that in a heterogeneous scenario — because the par-
ticipants have originally different capabilities, or because we had introduced
powerful devices to supply the demand — resources with scarce resources are
found in a difficult position to cooperate.
Known data mining techniques were used to show that, among others, the
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aggressiveness of the regular devices — in the sense that they perform a high
number of requests (See Chapter 5) — was one of the key factors. Considering
the modeled scenarios, when the available resources are scarce, the collaborative
applications should wait for a random time period before trying to submit new
jobs. It addresses two situations: (1) to reduce the probability of collision of
those requests and (2) to increase the utilization of shared resources. The new
behavior will impact the Quality of Service (QoS) of users at short term, while
will improve the network and computing efficiency.
Then, we have seen that the cooperation coefficient and the percentage of jobs
finally done depends on the topology of the overlay network. In some scenarios
we argued that it would be impossible to control how this overlay is built, while
some times it may be forced by software design. In such cases, the software
designers will be interested on implementing distributed algorithms to form
networks with Small-world properties. Kleinberg identified the problem of how
to find shortest paths in a decentralized way, in the case of Barabási–Albert
network with only local information [107], which is the underlying idea for the
work of Wang and Nakao [108], who propose a scheme of evolutionary game
theory for topology evolution to change any given overlay topology into the
Small-world structure.
Finally, the third component affecting the cooperation was the access to
resources and its distribution among the different locations. On one hand,
participants with fewer resources need in average more external resources than
powerful ones. On the other hand, powerful devices are interested on cooperate
in exchange for future favors. This is achieved by improving the connectivity of
regular nodes and incrementing the amount of heterogeneous edges. We proved
it experimentally, providing a hotspot placement heuristic that increments
the percentage of successful jobs 8% under favored conditions (just 2% if the
overlay topology has high density).
Chapter7
Social effort on incentives
Many of the current most successful cooperative applications have been built
around a community of practitioners and experts rather than by just private ini-
tiatives or stakeholders. However, the access to shared resources is still regulated
by traditional incentive mechanisms, which are usually based on participants’
contributions or resource sharing ignoring other non-technical activities that
members voluntarily perform to keep the community alive (e.g., administration
and coordination of the tasks). Therefore, some community members’ who
have played an active role in supporting the development, maintenance and
growing of the ecosystem may feel unfairly treated and discouraged to continue
contributing if their effort is not recognized somehow by the community.
In this chapter we focus our attention on measuring the effort of community
members in non-technically related tasks by analyzing their interactions in
common social venues, like mailing lists. In practice, it required first a) to test
some structural analysis methods and b) propose a new framework to detect
positions and roles in more complex social structures, like multi-relational and
multi-layer graphs. This chapter is our first step towards the design of incentive
mechanisms rewarding non-technical contributions on cooperative applications.
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7.1 Introduction
Like most large scale and distributed systems aimed to share resources in
a competitive environment, cooperative applications must be built upon a
supporting architecture with governing mechanisms that guarantees they can
operate efficiently. In the previous chapters we have discussed how to build
mechanisms more inclusive by a) measuring nodes’ efforts instead of their direct
contributions when they are sharing computational resources (Chapter 5) or
b) by introducing new computational resources in specific locations to increase
the cooperating opportunities of nodes with fewer resources (Chapter 6).
Both previous mechanisms are intended for scenarios where users can share
their superfluous computational resources, but they can also be easily adapted
to other common-pool resources. One characteristic of such scenarios is that
users are organized together as a community to guarantee that the ecosystem
works properly, instead of depending on some single authority.
Although the main purpose of the community is to share some good, the
tasks of community members also include other supporting activities necessary
for the growth and improvement of the ecosystem (e.g., coordinating meet-
ings, accounting). As an example, in volunteer and contributory applications
communities the main activity of the participants is to share computational
resources in exchange for others, while the supporting activities might include
developing or improving the software, helping new members or simply taking
care of the website.
Traditionally, the governing policies only paid attention to the time and effort
devoted to the main task of the community members, without considering that
the supporting activities are also very important. This difference of criteria
can cause a detachment from users towards the collective, creating a lack of
human resources which will lead to an inoperative common-pool resource.
However, under participatory economic principles, users — and more specifi-
cally, their time and effort devoted to the community — are also important
measurable and accountable resources. According to this idea, our framework
will measure the supporting activities performed by each user and report them
as a social effort, which will grant similar rewards as sharing resources with
others (a retribution in form of resources by their peers). While the mechanism
had created for compensating users already performing supporting tasks, it is
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expected that other users will join them as now they have an incentive to do
so.
In this chapter we narrowed the social venues under analysis to just on-line
participatory forums, which allows us to easily track users’ interactions. The
utility of users’ participation has been measured, hence, as its influence across
the graph of relations with their peers on the different participatory forums.
Therefore, the main contribution of this chapter is the introduction of
a new framework to find positions and roles using comparisons be-
tween actors and sets of actors instead of just using pairwise com-
parisons. In this way we enable the usage of many more measures of similarity
inside position and role detection methods (e.g., based on distances, community
structure, triangles and cliques). As a result, we can identify new types of
easily interpretable positions in complex graph structures like hypergraphs or
multiplex/multi-relational networks (which is needed to represent the interac-
tions among users in their common social venues).
We have evaluated our work on both synthetic and real data, using several
existing and new similarity measures and providing both qualitative and
quantitative evidence of the new possibilities enabled by our approach.
The next section presents a preliminary study motivating the development of
a new framework for identifying role and positions. Section 7.3 describes the
state of the art on blockmodeling systems for multi-dimensional data, while
Section 7.4 revisits the main concepts related with blockmodeling. Section 7.5
describes our extended framework. Section 7.6 shows and discusses the obtained
results. Section 7.7 presents the conclusions and the future work.
7.2 Motivation and problem definition
Creating a social effort measurement that reflects the users’ involvement and
participation in community supporting activities is a challenging task. Almost
any activity performed by some user that is related with the community could
be — potentially — considered as a contribution. Nevertheless, not all the
possible actions are an effort worth of being considered a useful contribution
for the community or to be rewarded.
Given the impossibility of defining and measuring something as subjective as
100
what useful contributions are, in this work we focus our attention on on-line
social venues and participatory forums because their nature make easier to
collect information, while provide a good representation of the relative influence
of users.
7.2.1 Measuring users participation in supporting activities
In order to have a brief idea about the challenges we need to address while
measuring the participation of users in such a complex system, let’s study the
differences between users’ participation in the main activity and supporting
activities in another context similar to ours. Figure 7.1 shows the empirical
cumulative distribution function (ECDF) plotted as the Lorenz curve, of users
participation in guifi.net [26], the largest community network [P1] to the best
of our knowledge. The participation is measured separately as the number
of new devices created by users — one of the main technical activities of
network communities — and the number of messages exchanged in one of its
participatory mailing list — which is a reflection of social interactions among
users with the aim to share knowledge or help other members.
Figure 7.1: Gini coefficient of two participatory forums in guifi.net.
The Gini coefficient [109], measured as the area between the line of equality and
each of the curves, is close to the absolute inequality in both activities — 0.8358
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in the devices creation and 0.8320 in the message exchange. Most importantly,
the Lorenz distribution function also suggests that network members behave
differently in terms of participation in the examined forums.
It is not unusual that there exists more than just one social venue or par-
ticipatory forum helping users to develop their supporting activities in the
same community. In the context of community networks, users might have
a mailing list to discuss general topics concerning the community and other
ones more generics to discuss software development efforts. As individuals, the
community members can show also different contribution patterns on each of
the participatory forums.
Figure 7.2 shows this effect by plotting the number of messages and devices
created by each user identified in two key mailing lists: users-list and dev-list.
Figure 7.2: Guifi.net users participation
We observe that most of the users are selective and choose to collaborate only
on one kind of activity (main or supportive), contributing with little or nothing
to the other. For example, there is a high concentration of users participating
in the development mailing list, but these are users which contributed only
with one or two devices to the physical communication network. Except
for a few members — founders or evangelists — users tend to choose to
collaborate only in one task of the community either the main one
or supporting ones.
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Notice also that users have heterogeneous levels of involvement on each par-
ticipatory forum too, making it harder to measure their effort in the overall
community.
7.2.2 Ranking users’ participation in supporting activities
The second important challenge we need to address is how cluster users with
similar levels of contribution, effort or involvement based on the inferred
measurements. As a first attempt, we conduct the analysis of interactions in
each participatory forum separately. Therefore, we built a graph with vertices
representing users and edges representing that two users had some relation (e.g.,
they had exchanged messages, or built a physical link between their wireless
nodes)1. Then, we will study the community structure in each participatory
forum separately.
Community structure is a common characteristic shown by most complex
networks, which allows us to discuss common properties among their members.
We analyzed the existence or not of community structures in our example as a
result of interactions between their members. Each boxplot in the Figure 7.3
summarizes the nodes composition of communities detected in our participatory
forums — Comm., Dev. and Users refer to the communication, dev-list
and users-list graphs — using the clique percolation and Louvain methods
(See 4.2.5). Members of a layer which do not belong to any community are not
represented.
The structural differences observed in the formation of both types of communi-
ties is a consequence of measuring the participation of users individually on
very different activities. In the main activity, for example, the amount of users
belonging to one or more communities is too small to be used as part of the
measurement. Users do not form strong bonds with their peers, because these
interactions mostly occur during new and sporadic setups of hardware devices.
The interactions on supporting forums — mailing lists in this case — have
higher chances to last, and hence form strong bonds among the members of
the community. As an example, the Louvain method detects communities
representing the 14.4% and 7.11%, of the users, while the clique percolation
method reveals another community structure, enclosed by a core group of
1How to build these graphs from the interactions in a mailing-list is the topic of Chapter 8.
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Figure 7.3: Number of nodes by community.
members representing around the 86.24% of the participants in both supporting
activities.
We can conclude, hence, that communities’ structures either do not
reveal clear patterns of participation in supporting activities or are
too inclusive to properly distinguish between different relational
patterns (I). Most probably, the social value of a community member in
the common-pool resource is more influenced by its connectivity and position
towards the rest of the participants than on his or her individual contributions.
For instance, if somebody sends a lot of messages to a single person, it does
not imply that he or she is generating any social value.
As an alternative, we measured the individual impact of the users inside the
network as their closeness centrality, HITS authorities and hubs (See 4.2.6). Ta-
ble 7.1. It revealed that there are only two users in common on all layers
among the 10 higher ranked members, which are identified as the network
founders. There are also two members in common in the mailing list which do
not appear as top ranked in the main activity layer.
This is consistent with several studies about the structure of community
networks [R2, R4] where their members reported that only a small fraction
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Table 7.1: Top leaders in multiple participatory forums
user-id Ranking schema communication users-list dev-list
0 closeness coefficient X X X
0 HITS authorities X X X
1 HITS authorities X X X
126 closeness coefficient X X
126 HITS authorities X X
32 closeness coefficient X X
of participants are interested on contributing to several facets of the resource-
pool ecosystem. Usually, senior members well connected and integrated, who
coordinate the different participatory forums. Thereby, the participation of
users in different supporting activities must be analyzed as a single
and complex structure (II).
Roles and positional analysis might offer techniques to understand and group
users according their influence in several graphs (solving problem I). However,
as we show in Section 7.4 traditional methods are limited to measures of
similarity based on pairwise comparisons, limiting the analysis to multi-layer or
multi-relational structures (which are necessary to solve problem II). Thereby,
the remaining chapter focus on describing a new framework to find
positions and roles using comparisons between actors and sets of
actors instead of just using pairwise comparisons.
7.3 Related work
7.3.1 Other related techniques to blockmodeling
Some recent advancements on generalized blockmodeling [16] are related with
the problem of finding roles — or positions — based on different relations
rather than direct connectivity of actors. In [110] authors use machine learning
techniques based on latent links detection to infer the possible features defining
the actors in the network, and hence to cluster actors based on them. As most
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direct approaches, the technique finds optimal or sub-optimal roles and clusters.
However, as a notion of equivalence is not explicitly defined, the semantics
of the identified blocks and which types of roles they represent requires an
additional interpretation.
The work of Doreian et.al. [111] instead, proposes a mechanism to find roles
in two-mode networks that is similar to the algorithm used in our proposal
to find generalized roles in a matrix with different dimensions. The solution
is efficient and effective when the two modes are disjoint sets of information,
but it has not been defined for matrices relating actors with sets of actors.
Finally, to our knowledge, none of the proposals in the literature of generalized
blockmodeling differentiate roles and positions as two structures under the
same assumptions of equivalence.
Several generalizations have been developed to find positions without perfect
similarity/dissimilarity [112], to be used in weighted graphs [16], or even
to find non-trivial equivalent positions [113]. While these approaches have
proved useful to detect some kinds of positions, and are flexible enough to
accommodate different kinds of similarity functions, they are also based on
pairwise relationships. However, the general idea of finding approximate
equivalences is also fundamental in our framework, because a strict check for
equivalence would rarely identify any groups of similar actors in real social
networks.
In this work, instead of just using pairwise relations we present a new framework
to find positions and roles using comparisons between actors and sets of actors.
With this change of perception, it is possible to find more complex positions,
or to study traditional ones in more complex network representations.
7.3.2 Positions and roles in multi-dimensional graphs
A recent work published by Rossi and Ahmed [114] is the closest work to
our idea of extended relations. In their proposal, the authors describe a new
taxonomy for role discovery methods, which also introduces the idea of “feature-
based role discovery”. According to their proposal, the similarity between nodes
can be measured using a set of node-structural features (e.g. degree, distance,
etc.), which can be any set of measures taken from the initial graph. Together,
they create a new matrix containing all the measures related to the actors.
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Then, they use machine learning techniques to infer the social feature-based
roles.
It is possible to argue that some of the extended equivalences proposed in
our work could be used as features in their model, but in our framework we
keep track of the relation between the measure — or feature — and the nodes
related to it — the subsets of nodes that are needed to compute the measure.
Because of this, our framework is able to measure not only patterns of relations
(roles), but also positions.
7.4 Social positions and roles revisited
7.4.1 Roles and positions as different structural concepts
Position and role analysis has been used to explain several phenomena in social
media. It has been used, for example, to categorize Wikipedia’s participants
into four groups — substantive experts, technical editors, counter vandalism
editors and social networking editors — based on their contributions and
interactions [115], with the aim of discriminating between editors with clear
expertise and regular contributors. In [116], instead, authors examined posts
and replies in Reddit to build a classifier to automatically detect the answer-
person roles. The proposed classifier can be used, among other things, to
understand which patterns encourage people to answer others and, hence, to
build reward systems to increase the number of actors with this role.
Both concepts, role and position, have been redefined many times in the
literature, both by mathematicians and sociologists, more or less in detail. In
this thesis we lie on the definition provided by Wasserman and Faust [15]:
In social network analysis position refers to a collection of
individuals who are similarly embedded in networks of relations,
while role refers to the pattern of relations which obtain between
actors or between positions. The notion of position thus refers to
a collection of actors who are similar in social activity, ties, or
interactions, with respect to actors in other positions.
Despite the lack of mathematical notation, this definition clearly states the
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idea of identifying positions as a clustering problem where actors — vertices of
a graph — are assigned to smaller subsets — called positions — based on a
notion of similarity. It is important to note that this similarity notion not only
measures how similar the local connectivity between pairs of actors is in the
graph, but can also measure other properties of the vertices — called relations,
or ties.
7.4.2 Equivalence as a similarity measure
Structural equivalence is the most basic and strict notion of similarity. Other
similarities have been developed lately to relax the notion of equivalence. In
regular equivalence [15], for example, two actors are in the same position if they
have similar relations with other positions; while in stochastic equivalence [112]
two actors are in the same position if they have the same probability distribution
of ties with other actors, which is more similar to the notion of role that we
are presenting in this work. A complete mathematical definition of all these
notions of equivalence, and other variants, can be found in [15].
While the concept of similarity has always been tied to the concept of equiva-
lence — local connectivity —, some alternatives have been proposed to include
other relations in order to measure the similarity between two actors. These
alternatives compute node-based or distance-based features, and use them
as an extra constraint to evaluate node equivalence. It is possible, hence, to
generalize the notion of structural equivalence from the original definition.
Let G = (U,E) be a graph representing a social network, where U is a set of
nodes representing actors and E(i, j) = 1 if nodes i and j are connected, 0
otherwise. Then, we can say that two nodes i and j are structurally equivalent
(and so in the same position) if and only if [117]:
E(i, k) = E(j, k) ∀k ∈ U ; k 6= i, j (7.1a)
Ah(i) = Ah(j) ∀h ∈ H (7.1b)
Dp(i, k) = Dp(j, k) ∀p ∈ P ; k 6= i, j (7.1c)
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where A is a set of H node attributes, where each node attribute is denoted
by Ah with h ∈ [1, H]; and D is a set of P comparison functions, where each
function is denoted by Dp and p ∈ [1, P ]. Regular equivalence would further
allow replacing k with previously identified positions, so that multiple iterations
can be computed.
Notice that these relations still constrain the model to a) the adjacency
connectivity matrix U and b) the pairwise actor comparison (i, j). For an
extended taxonomy and classification we suggest the recent work of Rossi and
Ahmed [114].
7.4.3 Roles and positions in complex networks
In the context of this thesis we need to identify social roles and positions in a
complex network, product of the aggregation of different graphs representing
the interactions among members of the commons social venues. Although the
traditional methods (Section 7.3) were developed to detect positions also in
multi-relational networks, the flatten or aggregation process cause a loss of
information that could misguide the results.
To illustrate the problem, consider the social network represented in Figure 7.4,
which shows the relationships between a group of eight actors. The network
is represented as a multi-relational graph, where each relation — or layer —
represents a friendship or a working relation between pairs of actors.
The analysis of the graph structure of each layer independently reveals social
positions of interest only for the relationship under analysis. As an example,
under the assumption of structural equivalence, we would like to group actors
that are connected to exactly the same other actors in the layer. The posi-
tional analysis using the structural equivalence definition finds four positions,
identified by color, in the Co-workers graph. They are resumed in Table 7.2.
Using the same definition of equivalence on the Friends layer, the positional
analysis will identify five different positions. Notice that while positions ρ1
(blue) and ρ2 (red) are exactly the same, members on positions ρ3, ρ4 and ρ5
are rearranged differently on each layer.
The alternative, will be to flatten the graph into a single-relational graph
with 8 actors and 11 edges before perform the structural analysis. In this
case, the same analysis will continue placing actors A, B and C in the same
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Figure 7.4: Complex example
Table 7.2: Structural equivalence positions in the multi-relational network
example
Layer ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5
Co-workers A, B C D, E F, G, H -
Friends A, B C E D, F G, H
Flattered A, B C D, E F G, H
previous positions ρ1 and ρ2, but it will still identify the subset of actors
{F,D,E,G,H} on different positions of interest. Even if the flattering process
is very simple, the positions found in the new graph are a combination of the
positions detected in each of the layers independently.
Both previous analysis turned out to be useful to discuss the structure of the
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social network, but none of them give us information about how the positions
between layers are related and which effect they have in the structure of the
multi-relational graph. Consider, as an example, the position of actors C and
F in the Figure 7.4. From the point of view of the structure of each layer,
the actor F is crucial to allow nodes {A,B,C,D,E} communicate with nodes
{G,H} while the node C is certainly not.
7.5 Extended blockmodeling framework
Blockmodeling [15] is, to our knowledge, the most used and explored technique
to detect roles and positions in social networks and, more generally, in any
system that can be modeled mathematically using a graph. In blockmodeling,
actors are grouped into positons — called blocks, sometimes roles — based on
a similarity or dissimilarity measure between them. To compute this measure,
actors are compared based on their social behaviour and structural connectivity
in the network. In its original form, the similarity measure corresponds to the
correlation between columns in the graph adjacency matrix, which results in
including actors connected to the same other actors into the same position —
as for the colored nodes in Figure 7.4.
In this section we describe our framework for group relations (Figure 7.8b)
which allows us to apply blockmodeling analysis to find social roles and positions
based on the global structure of the network, rather than being constrained to
pairwise comparisons (Figure 7.8a). The framework has two basic components:
the extended comparison function for group measures and the computing
algorithm for identifying positions and roles:
• The extended comparison function is a two-dimensional matrix (M) that
stores the similarity or dissimilarity between actors (rows) and sets of
actors (columns). We first need to identify subsets of actors depending on
the analysis we want to perform, then we must compute the comparison
function.
• The computing algorithm used in our experiments is a generalization of
the REGE/A algorithm proposed in [118] for regular equivalence. In gen-
eral, any clustering algorithm already used in unsupervised blockmodeling
analysis could be used instead.
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7.5.1 Extended comparison function for simple graphs
To be able to compare actors with subsets of actors we need to replace the
adjacency matrix typically used as an input for traditional blockmodeling with
a more complex structure, capable of storing extended relations. This matrix
will be used as input data for the computing algorithm.
Building it involves two main steps: a) dividing the actors into groups of
interest and b) defining the comparison measure. These two definitions are
interdependent, and need to be specified together.
As we have mentioned, our approach is based on a generic comparison function
D. Let G = (U,E) be a simple graph. Then2,
D : (U, S)→ R (7.2)
where S ⊆ 2U depends on D.
We can then use the functionD to build our extended matrixM , by substituting
the adjacency matrix equivalence in Eq. 7.1a by our formula. Hence, we can
define the extended matrix M as:
M(i, Sj) = D(i, Sj) (7.3)
As a concrete example, consider Figure 7.5, showing Padgett’s marriage network
[51] with each family colored according to its approximate (which we will define
later) social position (defined as being part of the shortest path connecting pairs
of nodes).
Families Albizzi and Guadagni are connected to totally different nodes, that
are themselves in different positions. So, they would not be considered being
part of the same position by existing methods. For example, if we check the
Medici family, Albizzi is connected to it while Guadagni is not. If we check
Lambertes, Albizzi is not connected to it while Guadagni is. However, if we
now consider the pair {Lambertes, Medici} and a comparison function:
22U indicates the power set of U
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Figure 7.5: Padgett’s marriage family network and approximate positions.
D(i, {k, q}) =
 1 if i ∈ short. path betw. k and q0 otherwise (7.4)
we can see that both Albizzi and Guadagni are on a shortest path between
them. If we check other pairs of nodes, we can see that this is true in several
other cases (e.g., to efficiently go from Bischeri to Ginori we should also pass
through both Albizzi and Guadagni). In summary, Albizzi and Guadagni are
included according our framework and the new similarity function D in the
same position because they share the same relationship with other pairs of
nodes, instead of single individuals.
Figure 7.6 shows the corresponding extended matrix M . Each cell in the
matrix corresponds to one binary relation between an actor i and a set of two
other actors (k, q). The rows and columns have been arranged in order to
group together similar positional actors.
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Figure 7.6: Extended relations matrix for the Padgett’s marriage family
network.
7.5.2 Positions and role assignment for simple graphs
After computing our extended comparison matrix, which associates each actor
in the network with the subsets of actors used to measure the equivalence, the
next step consists in partitioning the actors into βM = β1, β2, . . . βm similar
positions and ρZ = ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, . . . ρz similar roles.
While in traditional blockmodeling, only one of the partitions are calculated
because both – roles and positions – are considered interchangeable concepts,
determined uniquely by the definition of equivalence used; in our framework
they are different concepts that can be measured from the extended relations
matrix.
Positions are computed by clustering the rows of the extended matrix and
forming groups of actors whose relation with the same subsets are similar.
In the literature there are many clustering algorithms that can be used to
make the rows clustering assignment. In order to simplify the results, and for
comparison purposes with other indirect blockmodeling methods, we decided
to use hierarchical clustering. In concrete, we first generate a dissimilarity
matrix by computing the euclidean distance between rows of our extended
matrix M and then we generate a hierarchical clustering using the Ward [119]
cluster similarity function.
The same procedure can be also repeated for the columns in order to highlight
to which subsets each block is related with — even though positions are only
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identified as subsets of the rows given the asymmetry of the matrix. Finding
the optimal number of clusters for the positions assignments is discussed in
detail in Section 7.5.3.
As an example of positional analysis, we used our method and depicted
in Figure 7.5 the resulting assignment of actors that are being part of the
shortest path that connects pairs of nodes into four positions. Table 7.3, instead,
shows the corresponding roles detected using the same equivalence.
Notice that the two assignments are not identical. While the Medici family,
as an example, is the single member of a role and a position, Strozzi and
Tornabuon, who play the same social role, are in fact in different positions —-
because they are in the same number of shortest paths, but between different
sets of actors. Under a strict check of equivalences between the rows of the
extended matrix, positions would be finer partitions of the roles. However, this
is not guaranteed when approximate clustering algorithms are used.
Table 7.3: Roles identified in Padgett’s marriage families network.
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5
ACCIAIUOL CASTELLAN BARBADORI ALBIZZI MEDICI
GINORI PERUZZI BISCHERI GUADAGNI
LAMBERTES SALVIATI
PAZZI TORNABUON
PUCCI RIDOLFI
STROZZI
0 4, 7 11 - 17 26, 27 50
A similar procedure is followed to identify roles, using the same extended matrix
M previously used to compute positions. However, instead of comparing their
relations with each subset of actors, we use their patterns of relations — that
is, some summary of the distribution of row values. Then, actors are grouped
using any clustering algorithm.
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7.5.3 Positions and roles uncertainty
We have previously mentioned the possibility of using different degrees of
freedom for each definition of equivalence, especially when the notion of
structural equivalence is used.
This is common practice in the blockmodeling literature: it is unlikely to
find any meaningful structurally equivalent positions in networks with dense
structures, like Padgett’s marriage families network ( Figure 7.5): the normal
variability in connectivity prevents us from finding two nodes with many
connections and connected with the exact same other nodes. As a result, every
single actor in the network will be placed in a different position with only one
member.
To relax the definition, and find meaningful positions and roles using indirect
approaches, it is sometimes necessary to utilize some knowledge about the
social network under analysis, e.g., specifying the number of expected positions.
Figure 7.7: Dendrogram representing the hierarchical clustering in Figure 7.6
As an alternative, we can measure how good different partitioning are by
measuring the relative distance between the maximum height of the hierarchical
clustering and the height of the cutting point in the dendrogram. In Figure 7.7
we show it for our working example. Ideally, cutting the dendrogram at height
h = 0% we will find positions where all the blocks are either complete or
zero. As we pull up the cutting point we will increase the uncertainty, but we
will be able to group actors into fewer positions. This relaxation of the block
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formation can be applied to all extended measures, and make them comparable
in terms of uncertainty.
In our experiments we refer to “minimum height (hmin)” as the minimum
percentage of h needed, for a particular clustering, to find at least one position
with more than one actor. Having a higher or lower hmin does not imply that a
particular solution is more or less correct, but we can make the hypothesis that
if larger positions are present in the data and the adopted similarity measure
is appropriate, these will be identified with less need for approximations — on
the other side of the scale, with h = 100% uncertainty all actors would be
included into one single position.
7.5.4 Extending the framework for complex graphs
Following our initial motivation of detecting roles and positions in multi-
dimensional structures, we need to extend the proposed methodology to capture
this information. It requires incorporating multi-relational measures into
the extended relations matrix (e.g., multi-relational versions of betweenness
centrality) considering the cost of moving from one relation to the other.
Figure 7.8 allows us to compare the traditional blockmodeling solutions explored
early (7.8a) with the extended framework for complex graphs (7.8a).
While the original matrix is a regular cube storing the k adjacency matrices
of the complex network, the new structure is a non-regular structure where
each cell represents the similarity value between a user i and a set Sj in layer
k based on a specific comparison function D.
Then, instead of calculating positions individually, or using an aggregation
matrix; in our framework they are computed using a multi-relational measure.
As an example, we could reuse our comparison function 7.4 by simply redefinin-
ing the pair {k, q} as pairs of nodes not part of any component in any layer.
Therefore, the comparison function D(i, {k, q}) will represent if a particular
node i is a bridge vertex connecting two disconnected vertices.
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(a) Traditional blockmodeling strategies
(b) Multi-relational framework
Figure 7.8: Blockmodeling frameworks for multi-relational graphs
7.6 Results
In order to evaluate our framework we built a library in R using the blockmodeling-
package [120] as a baseline. The library has been used to perform the ex-
perimental analysis, which included the detection of roles and positions with
different combinations of simple graphs and equivalences. It simplifies the
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comparison of the identified structures with other equivalences well estab-
lished, assuming that the extension of the methodology to higher-dimensional
structures will still be meaningful.
7.6.1 Datasets
We evaluated our proposal using a set of real social networks, which are
representative of the social structures that arise from the physical interactions
among actors — like the Padgett’s dataset — and are well known in the
literature. Additionally, we created a set of synthetic networks for comparison
purposes.
• Florentine families [51]: contains a two-relational graph describing the
social relations among Renaissance Florentine families (person aggregates)
collected by John Padgett from historical documents. Both relations —
business ties and marriage alliances — were used as individual graphs.
• AUCS [121]: contains a five-relational graph describing the social re-
lations among employees of a Computer Science department. The five
relations are: lunch, work, co-authorship, leisure and Facebook friendship.
For the analysis we have flattened the network into a mono-relational
graph.
• Synthetic data: contains a set of networks built using the Erdos-
Renyi [47] and Barabasi [50] models, with the same number of nodes as
our real networks, but varying densities.
These networks are good representations of random graphs and the scale-free
model which has been used for comparison purposes.
7.6.2 Other extended relations as equivalences
On previous sections we have described our framework using the example
measure of being in the shortest path (BSP), which intends to capture
actors in positions of connectivity between the same other actors. Next we
describe a set of easily interpretable measures, intended to demonstrate the
possibilities of our framework, and how to build their corresponding matrix M .
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• Clique connectivity (CC): given the set of cliques in the network, the
CC groups together actors with the same number of ties to the same
cliques. Hence, the — valued — matrix M contains network cliques as
columns and as values the sum of ties between each actor Ui and the
members in each clique Sl.
• Minimum Clique connectivity (MCC): given the set of cliques in
the network, the MCC groups together actors with at least one tie to
the same cliques. Hence, the — binary — matrix M contains network
cliques as columns and 1 if the row actor has at least one tie with some
member of the clique, 0 otherwise.
• Community connectivity (COMC): groups together actors that are
connected to the same maximum-modularity communities. Hence, the
— valued — matrix M contains the communities as columns, and the
percentage of ties to their members as a values.
• Others community connectivity (OCOMC): groups together actors
that are connected to other communities. Hence, the valued matrix M
contains the communities as a columns, and the percentage of ties to
their members as a values, discarding ties to its own community.
7.6.3 Framework validation
As any indirect blockmodeling methodology, the meaning and profitability
of the findings reported by our framework are highly tied with the similarity
measure used, which has to be chosen carefully. Potentially, any measure
based on the topological structure of the social network — like distance-based
measures — could be used as an equivalence.
However, in practice, it is necessary to discard measures of equivalence that do
not find any dissimilarity — meaning, all actors are always grouped together —
or measures where the assignment of actors into either roles or positions is a
consequence of some random phenomenon. While the first problem is more
dependent on the network structure (e.g., by definition we cannot find more
than one position or role in Torus networks), the later is mostly related with
our framework and hence we need to address it.
In order to verify the lack of randomness in our equivalences we tested the
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framework by comparing the positions found in our real social network with
those found in 6 different synthetic random graphs. Figure 7.9 shows the number
of different positions found as the percentage of uncertainty (h) using the several
extended similarity measures. Measures are grouped together by pattern:
the first plot (7.9a) groups together results regarding communities extended
similarities — COMC and OCOMC —, the second plot (7.9b) regarding
distance-based measures and cliques and the third one (7.9b) plots measures
regarding only the minimum clique connectivity (MCC).
On each plot, synthetic networks noted as “ER-p” are built according to the
Erdos-Renyi model with probability p, while the networks noted as “BA-p”
are scale-free graphs according to the Barabasi-Albert model with exponent p.
Each experiment has been repeated 10 times in order to avoid random effects
caused by the network formation.
The experiment identified three different patterns of positions. Figure 7.9
shows, for each category, the number of positions found as y-axis and the
corresponding uncertainty level h (x-axis). Hence, the left-most value of h for
each curve represents the minimum uncertainty found in the measure (hmin).
We can observe that in all three patterns the “real social” network always
finds positions with equal (Figure 7.9a) or less (Figure 7.9b and Figure 7.9c)
uncertainty as the synthetic graphs, and hence, closer to the ideal clustering of
actors based on the definition of similarity.
In general, random graphs like the Erdos-Renyi networks present higher values
of uncertainty hmin when our method is used. On the other hand, Barabasi
networks are formed by a preferential attachment process, which is more similar
to the interaction processes that form social networks, and hence is more likely
that the positions found are capturing some social properties from the graph.
However, as the number of nodes in a graph decreases it is more likely that
structural differences become less evident. As said, the same experiment,
repeated with the Padgett’s marriage network and the corresponding synthetic
graphs with the same number of nodes reveal that all similarity measures have
hmin = 0% and follow the same pattern shown in Figure 7.9a.
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(a) Community based results
(b) SE, BSP and CC results
(c) MCC results
Figure 7.9: Number of different positions found as the percentage of uncertainty.
7.6.4 Similarity measures analysis
The different sizes of positions depicted in Figure 7.9a are related with the
flexibility, in terms of measure, of each equivalence. More sub-settings of
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actors will increase the number of possible rows combinations, and hence,
more heterogeneous positions; while fewer sub-settings will tend to create less
positions with fewer uncertainty.
Another factor that may influence the flexibility of the measure is how the
connectivity between actors and subsets is defined. As an example, for a
given actor is not the same count if is connected or not to a subset of actors
(e.g. a clique or a community), than counting if it has at least one tie with
the subset, or the percentage of ties with the members of the subset. The
measures proposed in this work, are good examples of meaningful measures
for the analysis of social networks, but the framework does not constrain the
definition of other interesting measures.
Another important aspect that must be taken into account for the interpre-
tation of the results is the uncertain information management. The indirect
blockmodeling methodology needs some guidance in order to distinguish be-
tween positions — or roles — related with the similarity measure, and other
clusters containing actors not really captured. Consider, for example, our BSP
extended measure, which tries to group together actors in the same shortest
path as other actors. Then, by definition, nodes that are not in any shortest
path between nodes or are completely disconnected to other nodes in the graph
will be all placed in the same position by the clustering algorithm. However,
they do not represent a position of interest, but rather a set of actors for which
the measure does not apply.
Figure 7.10 shows the first two positions detected — those with minimum h
values — by our framework in the business social network of Florentine families.
Each group of two graphs represents, for each extended measure, the clustering
of actors into the two positions with smaller h. On each graph, nodes grouped
together with the same color represent the positions detected on each case.
However, we marked with gray those nodes not considered in the measure –
even if they are grouped in some position by the algorithm. These nodes are
usually disconnected ones, leaves of the topology or — like Ginori family in
the BSP measure — nodes connected in such a way that is not captured by
the measure at hand.
The individual analysis of the measures shows that, for the given social network,
the framework is able to find positions with no uncertainty (hmin = 0), but their
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(a) SE. h = 0% (b) SE. h = 25% (c) BSP. h = 0% (d) BSP. h = 17%
(e) CC. h = 0% (f) CC. h = 12% (g) MCC. h = 0%(h) MCC. h = 53%
(i) COMC.h 0% (j) COMC.h 11% (k) OCOMC.h 0%(l) OCOMC.h 57%
Figure 7.10: Positions detected using traditional measures – structural equiv-
alence (SE) – and the extended measures introduced in this paper for the
Business social network of Florentine families, at varying levels of uncertainty
interpretability is not always clear. It occurs because the clustering algorithm
groups together too few nodes. As an example, the OCOMC measure finds
two clear positions which corresponds to the actors connecting the upper
community with the bottom one; while the BSP measure identifies each actor
with a single position of one element.
One possible solution is to analyze higher uncertainty positions (those with
h > 0), but this requires human supervision to interpret the results. As
an example, Figure 7.11 shows the all possible positions detected using our
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extended method for the Marriage social network of Florentine families, at
varying levels of uncertainty using the BSP measure.
(a) h = 0% (b) h = 28% (c) h = 34% (d) h = 40%
(e) h = 41% (f) h = 46% (g) h = 49% (h) h = 52%
(i) h = 56% (j) h = 64% (k) h = 82% (l) h = 100%
Figure 7.11: Positions detected using the extended BSP measure at varying
levels of uncertainty
We can see how actors are being grouped into different positions, as the level
of uncertainty approximates the 100%. From the picture, we could be tempted
to pick some result with uncertainty larger than 50% as the measure seems
to be capturing some structure in the network. Nevertheless, this would be a
mistake as we don’t really know if the similarly measure chosen exists or not in
the original network. Therefore, our only solution is to lie on the minimum h.
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7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced the idea of social effort, as a measure of the
participation of users in common social venues which are part of communities
built around common-pool resources. This supporting activities are of great
interest, because they are necessary to organize and coordinate the main
activity (e.g., to guarantee the users’ compliance with the common governing
rules and mechanisms presented in the previous chapters).
Our first analysis shown that detecting and clustering users based on their
participation would require the development of new mechanisms for measuring
new types of social positions and roles in simple and complex models, like
multi-relational networks. Therefore, we have proposed a conceptual extension
of blockmodeling that allows us to plug in additional comparison functions
not usable in a standard setting. At the same time, this extension enables the
discovery of new kinds of positions also on simple networks: in this chapter we
have focused on this aspect, providing an analysis of the new possibilities and
limits of our proposal.
More in detail, according to our proposal, to enable the usage of the additional
types of similarity functions discussed in this work it is necessary to change the
regular similarity matrices for a more complex structure able to relate actors
in a network with a) the extended measure and b) the extra information used
to compute such measure – in this case, subsets of actors. These new measures
generate a new asymmetric equivalence matrix, that can be analyzed to find
both social roles and positions.
The selection of the extended measure depends entirely on the objective of the
analysis and/or the meaning of the positions and roles desired. Theoretically,
any measure computed in a graph as a result to apply a given function over a
node and a set of nodes would be a candidate. In practice, we have observed
that some of the measures generate higher values of uncertainty (h), that is,
they require a higher level of approximation to identify positions containing
multiple nodes. Therefore, the interpretation of the results will be more
difficult.
Although during the analysis presented in this chapter we have used several new
definitions of extended measures, they are provided as simple examples based
on well-known concepts in networks. It is expected, hence, that community
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members agree which similarity measure to use based on the social venues they
have, and the kind of roles they want to reward.
Part III
Discussion
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Chapter8
Community based incentives for
cooperative applications
The mechanism schema introduced in this thesis uses the community of users as
an externality to enforce that all the participants comply with the incentive (See
Chapter 5). In Chapter 7 we have shown, however, that users are naturally
and spontaneously inclined to participate in only one type of activity. In order
to measure their participation on the supporting tasks, we have developed a new
detection framework for identifying roles and positions in multiplex graphs, but
there are still some questions unsolved in practice.
The objective of this chapter is to review all aspects of the schema not previously
solved and provide a practical solution for each one of them. This chapter
addresses, firstly, how to built a graph representation of users’ interactions
to perform the analysis of roles and positions announced early on. Then, we
complete the incentive scheme by studying how influence the sharing outcome
of users using the information provided by the supporting activities. Finally, we
will generalize our schema for larger scenarios with multiple types of resource.
129
130
8.1 Introduction
The active participation of community members is key for the success of the pro-
posed incentive mechanisms, since we assume that they will implicitly enforce
users to comply with the rules designed. However, the analysis performed in
Chapter 7 shows that in absence of some externality, users will not participate
in both types of activity — main and supporting — simultaneously.
Users’ participation in the cooperative process is stimulated explicitly by the
mechanisms designed in Chapters 5. Therefore, we designed a new schema that
rewards their participation in supporting activities giving them in return higher
cooperation opportunities in the common-pool resources (See Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Incentive framework for cooperative applications
The top of Figure 8.1 describes the social component of the framework, which
monitors the activity of users in several supporting forums, and reports a
single “social effort” score based on their positions and roles using the methods
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described in Chapter 7 for simple and complex graph structures. Modeling
all supporting activities as a graph is an open problem that each application
must solve depending on several environmental factors (e.g., how users interact
between them, what supporting activities they want to account).
As actually most of these interactions occur through online social forums, in
Section 8.2 we discuss a method to model users’ interactions in mailing-lists as
a multiplex graph structure. In this section, our intention is to provide a useful
example, rather than a generic method for all sort of participatory forums.
In Section 8.3 we finally introduce a simple model for transferring the social
effort score to the main activity (See Figure 8.1), allowing users to either
compensate the lack of resources shared with higher supporting tasks or to
compete for larger sets of resources than other peers with the same sharing
ratio.
Finally, in Section 8.4 we generalize our framework for applications with
multiple shared resources. The new design allows system designers to score
users’ effort as a linear combination of several activities, and to dynamically
weight the impact of each task by the type of resources it needs.
8.2 Graph generation from supporting activities
Users’ participation — or effort — is a vague concept that can embrace almost
any activity performed by community members. In the context of this thesis
we decided, instead, to measure the results of such effort. Hence, assuming
that users devoting similar effort and time to the supporting activities will
have similar patterns of interactions, we decided to score users’ participation
by identifying their social roles and positions.
In this section we explore how to build the users’ graph of relations, using
the interactions happening in on-line communication platforms and, more
specifically, on their community mailing-lists. The overall objective is to
provide just an example of how to extract relationship information from on-line
sources. This method can be used with other participatory forums (e.g., online
discussion forums or live-chats) too, but it will require to be adjusted properly.
The method described in this section has been tested using Guifi.net [26]
mailing-lists data. Guifi.net network is a community network (See Section 3.1.2)
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started in 2004, and in 2014 reached more than 24,000 operational devices,
most of them in Catalonia and nearly all of them in the Iberian peninsula.
The community has 42 mailing-lists for general purposes (e.g., discussing new
deployments, helping new users).
8.2.1 Extracting relations
The objective of our schema is to transform the information contained on all
the threads in a mailing-list, to multiple complex graph structures — one per
mailing-list —, losing as few information as possible in the process. In this
way, each of the structures can be simplified (e.g., by selecting some temporal
windows, flattern the multi-relations) or grouped in a single multiplex graph
later.
Figure 8.2 shows in the left-side a tree representation of two original threads
in one of the mailing-lists studied. Each vertex in the tree represents a new
message, and its label indicates the user who has sent the message. Each
children of a given vertex represents a reply from some user to its parent
message. All the subtrees of the original graph can be treated as a new thread
conversation, or as part of the original thread. Our methodology is indifferent
to both interpretations.
The right-side of the Figure 8.2 instead, shows the resulting complex graph
structure after processing the two original threads. There are two types of
vertex: users — represented as circles — and colored squares — representing
an answer message from one of the two original threads. The label of each
circle is a unique identifier indicating the user sending the message, while the
label of each square is an incremental integer indicating the order — in practice,
the timestamp — when each message has sent to the mailing-list. The edges
in the right-side of the figure show the relation between users, threads and
messages.
In Figure 8.3 we have separated both types of vertices — users and messages —
and their relations, to simplify the understanding of their relations. Figure 8.3a
shows the messages’ graph, where we can appreciate that the red arrows indicate
the order of the messages in the thread. As an example, the brown message
0 is the first message sent in the second thread — originally from user G. It
received three answers, which are messages 1, 2 and 4. We can observe that
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Figure 8.2: Graph generation process
this structure maintains both, the logical and temporal order of the information
in the online supporting forum. Figure 8.3b instead, shows the users’ graph
with vertices representing users and each edge (i, j) an answer from user i to a
previous published message from j.
(a) Messages’ graph (b) Multi-relational users’ graph
Figure 8.3: Resulting networks of relations
The main problem with the last representation is that it does not provide any
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information about who started or finished each of the possible conversations
in the original mailing-lists. For example, we can appreciate in Figure 8.2
an undirected edge between user G and the brown message 0 — which does
not have any other edge — indicating that G was the starter of the original
thread. Additionally, the messages’ graph might provide extra information
about the intention of the message as each square node stores the entire message
information (timestamp, subject, text and attachments).
In practice, for the structural analysis we described in Chapter 7 we used the
users’ graph, grouping all edges between two vertices in a single indirected one,
with a weight equal to the number of original edges in both directions. Other
designs and applications might get advantage from the information provided
by the complex network graph (See Figure 8.2) for building their incentive
schema.
8.2.2 Homonyms detection
Homonymity is a characteristic of most distributed systems, like Peer-to-Peer
applications, which implies the existence of users with multiple identifiers in
the network [122]. Usually, homonymity emerges naturally because the system
does not provide a single authentication mechanism. For example, in most
community networks users have to register themselves independently on each
mailing-lists in which they want to participate, thus providing a different email
address each time.
Detecting homonyms is necessary to relate the information from different
sources. More importantly, homonyms detection can be used as a first step
for detecting whitewashing [123] — users’ changing of identity to avoid being
evaluated by their past activities.
When authentication method is based on the users’ email, we can take advantage
of the fact that most of the email addresses are a combination of the name and
surname of the real users and, hence, they will be similar. In our experiments
homonymity was detected using the email similarity rule suggested by Bird
et.al. [124], which is based on the Levenshtein edit distance between email
address bases (the original without the domain information). Although this
method provided good results in practice — only a 7% of the homonyms were
not detected — it needs higher refinements to avoid human intervention.
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8.3 A complete framework
In this section we propose a regulation mechanism, able to reward users, not
only for their effort in contributing with physical resources, but also for their
work in supporting activities that benefits the community of participants (e.g.,
based on the social effort score developed early on Chapter 7).
Using this regulation mechanism, participants in common-pool resources, like
community networks (See Section 3.1.2), will be willing to contribute more
often in supporting activities. Moreover, those who are already dealing with
these tasks can get a higher reward when they need to use the community
applications or infrastructure.
In order to evaluate the proposal, we conducted several simulations using
an extended version of the n-players Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (n-IPD)
framework. We modified the payoff matrix of the n-IPD to include a small
social reward, which represents a compensation for users involved in supporting
activities.
8.3.1 Social rewarding model
The simulation model consists on two different networks, where nodes —
representing users — can be present in one or both topologies, as it represents
the Figure 8.4. The top network (Gsupporting) represents the social structure
of one supporting activity, or a flattern graph extracted from multiple ones. In
this network we have split the nodes into two categories — representing two
possible roles or positions —, being active with a random probability p and
passive with a probability (1− p). In the bottom network (Gmain) nodes will
play an extended version oft he n-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, where
each node i present in both networks and considered active in the Gsupporting
graph will be rewarded with an extra payoff αi if has decided to cooperate
with its neighbours.
Table 8.1 shows the payoff matrix of our extended version of the n-IPD. Without
loss of generality, we can fix the cooperation reward (a = 1), the punishment
to defeat (ε = 0.05), and the value received for cooperating (c = 0). Thus,
we can study the influence of the other parameters in the game, which would
allow performing a simplified analysis of the results [125].
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Figure 8.4: Participation’s transfer model
Table 8.1: Payoff matrix of Extended Prisoner’s Game
Player decision Co-player Cooperate Co-player Deflection
Cooperate (a+ α1, a+ α2) (c+ α1, b)
Defection (b, c+ α1) (ε, ε)→ 0
To prevail the dilemma in this game, the punishment parameter ε must take a
value in the interval [0,1), and the payoffs rule — originally, b > a > ε→ 0 > c
— must be updated to b > 1 + αi > ε→ 0 > c+ αi for all i nodes. After the
simplifications of the reward and punishment values, we can state that the
α interval must be (0.005, 0.4). If this relation is preserved, the participants
do not need knowing the value of their neighbors’ social reward αi to decide
if cooperate or defeat, because such a value does not influence the game.
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Therefore, the game could be simplified to a symmetric version, where the
unknown information does not change the philosophical dilemma.
As our extended version of the game prevails the original Prisoner’s dilemma
spirit, it is well-known that the rational choice is always to defect, not only
to prevent betrayals by other players, but also because it always gives higher
payoff, no matter what the other player does (it is a Nash equilibrium [126]).
However, it is also clear that the community welfare would be higher if both
nodes decide to cooperate, and just here lays the dilemma. In order to address
this challenge and understand the consequences of our proposal, we developed
two extended versions of the prisoner’s dilemma framework.
• Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma (EPD). This version corresponds
exactly to the model described before, where for each interaction between
two players, we add a social reward in case of cooperation.
• Minimum Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma (MEPD). In order to
test the consequences of smaller changes into the original prisoner’s
dilemma game, we modified our extended payoff matrix. In this case the
social reward is only added to each node once per round, resulting in
smaller increments of the payoff for the cooperating nodes.
8.3.2 Modeling social dynamics
During the first round of the n-IPD game, all nodes make an individual decision
between cooperate or defeat against their partners; these alternatives have
equal probability to be chosen. During the next rounds, the system dynamic
is controlled by the update strategy of the nodes (i.e., the nodes can change
their cooperation strategy depending on the results of the past rounds). We
evaluated our proposal using several update strategies, which are representative
of the way that users make decisions in their real life [127].
• Voter Model (VM). When users adopt this strategy, they behave
similar to a particular neighbor. This imitation process has shown to
be representative of many people during electoral processes [128], and it
is a suitable manner to use social imitation mechanisms to deal with a
strategy problem.
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• Unconditional Imitator (UI). This strategy is similar to the previous
one, but the user imitates to the neighbor with the best payoff, provided
that such value is larger than his own. The UI strategy might resemble
the actions of the people in real life, when some neighbor has enough
information to make suitable decisions [127, 129].
• Replicator Rule (REP). With REP nodes choose a neighbor at ran-
dom. Then, if the payoff of the chosen neighbor is larger than the node’s
own, the node adopt the neighbor’s strategy with a probability propor-
tional to the difference between both payoffs. In other case, nothing
changes. REP is pairwise and stochastic; i.e., a node decides how to
evolve, watching only one neighbor per round, and the result of the
evolution is not univocally determined.
• Unconditional Imitator (UI). In this case, a node select a neighbor
with probability proportional to their payoff, without considering whether
it is larger than its own or not [130]. MOR works as a local and stochastic
process that allows the individuals to make mistakes; i.e., there is a non-
zero probability to imitate a neighbor with bad fitness. This strategy
can be considered as a weighted social imitation, where the weight is the
success of the observed node.
8.3.3 Modeling social dynamics
The whole n-IPD game used for evaluating our proposal is described in Algo-
rithm 5. For simplicity, the algorithm only includes the initialization stage
and the main loop. The initialization stage has two main functions: Calcu-
lateAlpha function assigns a positive social score α to node i if, and only if,
the node is in the set S. calculateInitialAction just assigns the first action
of each node i as Cooperate or Defeat with 50% probability each.
Then, the main loop starts and is executed for a fixed period of time t = [0, T ]
(usually 250 rounds). On each of the executions, the algorithm calculates the
payoff of nodes during the given round as the sum of the payoffs for each
interaction of the game according the EPD payoff matrix (lines 7:10), and
decides if nodes will change strategy by imitation or will continue playing the
same strategy next round (lines 11:18). Functions chooseCandidate and
imitate are, therefore unique for each imitation strategy.
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Algorithm 5 Extended n-IPD game
Require: Gmain(V,E) . Network graph
Require: S . Set of active nodes in the supporting network
Require: EPD(b, α) . Extended payoff matrix
Require: T . Simulation time
1: for all i ∈ V do . Initialization
2: i.α←calculateAlpha(i, S,EPD.α)
3: i.action[t]←calculateInitialAction
4: end for
5: t← 0
6: while t ≤ T do . Main loop
7: for all (i, j) ∈ E do . Payoff computing phase for t
8: i.score[t]← i.score[t]+calcScore(i.action[t], j.action[t], EPD)
9: j.score[t]← i.score[t]+calcScore(j.action[t], i.action[t], EPD)
10: end for
11: for all i ∈ V do . Imitation phase for t + 1
12: j ←chooseCandidate(i, i.neighbors)
13: if imitate(i.payoff [t], j.payoff [t]) = true then
14: i.action[t+ 1]← j.action[t+ 1]
15: else
16: i.action[t+ 1]← i.action[t+ 1]
17: end if
18: end for
19: t← t+ 1
20: end while
21: return Gmain
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As an example, according the REP rule, nodes first choose a neighbor at
random using the chooseCandidate function, and then decide if they will
change or not strategy. Algorithm 6 shows, as an example, the imitate
function of REP rule. Firstly, the function compares if the calculating player
has more or less payoff than its opponent (line 1). If it has more payoff, then
computes the differences of payoff as a probability (line 2) and tests it against
a random number generated using a continuous uniform distribution (line 6).
Algorithm 6 Imitate function for REP strategy
Require: PAY OFFa . Payoff player node
Require: PAY OFFb . Payoff co-player node
1: if PAY OFFb > PAY OFFa then
2: probImitate← 1− PAY OFFb−PAY OFFaPAY OFFb+PAY OFFa
3: else
4: return false
5: end if
6: if probImitate > U(0, 1) then
7: return false
8: end if
9: return true
8.3.4 Positive and negative effects on the community welfare
The most straightforward way to determine the effects of the proposed incentive
model, is measuring the average of cooperating nodes density, as function of
the parameter α, and then compare the results with the regular PD. Figure 8.5
shows the improvement of the EPD for two specific strategies (REP and UI),
with a reward to betrayers b = 1.1 and 20% of users socially rewarded from 0.005
to 0.045. The improvement was calculated as the difference between the average
cooperation during the last 250 rounds for each individual simulation. Positive
values represent improvements produced by our proposal, while negative values
represent the opposite.
In Figure 8.5 we can also see that when the community uses a UI strategy, it
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is not clear which of both frameworks — PD or EPD — is more beneficial
for the social welfare of the community. However, when the users use a REP
approach on the EPD framework, there is a higher probability of improving
the cooperation inside the community.
Figure 8.5: Average cooperation density using the REP and UI strategy.
The presented results are not enough to make strong conclusions about the
existence of minimum values of α that ensure higher incentive using the EPD
framework. However, Figure 8.5 shows that, as a general rule, higher values of
α appear when the EPD framework is used. As an example, less than 9% of
the values of α above 0.02, have generated a negative impact higher than 0.03.
Figure 8.6 helps us understand how each update strategy influences the coop-
eration on the three PD frameworks. Comparing the overall behavior of the
system, we can state that MOR strategy does not allow the cooperating nodes
to survive despite the used incentive mechanism. On the opposite side, the
VM and UI update strategies are appropriate for reaching high percentages of
cooperating nodes.
The minimum values of social reward were reached using the MEPD framework.
This happens because the small changes introduced in the MEPD payoff matrix
played a negative effect in the cooperation level of the system. Therefore,
we can argue that when nodes compare their payoff after each round, the
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Figure 8.6: Average cooperation density using three PD frameworks with
different update strategies.
contribution of the social reward to nodes’ payoff is not enough to surpass
the effect of the temptation reward, and hence, most of the socially rewarded
nodes decide at some point to imitate some defeater neighbor.
The EPD payoff achieves about 11% of improvement, compared to the regular
PD payoff value reached when users’ update their cooperation decision using
all the information about their neighbors (i.e., a VM strategy). However,
the EPD framework does not affect the density of cooperating nodes when
decisions are taken locally (i.e., when using VM and REP strategies).
8.3.5 Influence in presence of highly defection reward
Provided the previous results have been obtained for a specific combination of
payoff values, it is important to check their generalization when the relation-
ship between the payoffs changes. Figure 8.7 shows the average cooperation
percentage achieved by the community for different simulations, using a VM
update strategy, an EPD payoff matrix and a 60% of socially rewarded nodes.
The results show that regardless the reward value (α), as the reward to the
betrayers (b) increase from 1.1 to 1.4, the overall cooperation drops from
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100% to almost 0%. However, it is also noticeable that higher values of social
reward can help system designers to maintain the cooperation density between
reasonable values.
Figure 8.7: Average cooperation density of VM strategy, as a function of b and
α
This result has a number of implications about the basic equation that we have
assumed for the PD framework. For instance, and additionally of the ratio
between the temptation value b and the punishment value ε, the designers
have to carefully consider the implications of the α, which – in a limited way –
can play a role similar to ε during the game. However, as the social reward
only needs to be applied to a fraction of the community, it avoids increasing
the payoff to mutual cooperators. Provided the social reward cannot exceed
the value of ε, these strategies cannot deal with high values of b, like 1.4.
The relation between both, b and α has also been observed in other combinations
of update strategies and percentages of nodes. However, sub-communities
involving socially rewarded users need a higher α to counter-balance the
increments of b.
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8.3.6 Evaluation using real community data
It is apparently clear that rewards should be assigned to people contributing
to the community welfare, even if they perform supporting activities. Through
an exploratory study we extended the PD framework in order to consider a
social reward for community members doing these activities.
The first observations lead to the conclusion that even small values of social
reward, have a direct impact (mostly positive) on the overall community
cooperation level. It happens because (1) the risk to be defeated after a
cooperation has also been reduced for some nodes, and (2) the reward to users
that conduct a mutual cooperation has been increased. This consideration is
consistent with the results reported in [131], where it is shown that individuals
tend to react more positively to truly rewards on cooperation in the context of
a public goods experiment.
Our study also found that there is a threshold (α = 0.02) over which the
difference in cooperation using the EPD framework is always positive, even
in presence of high rewards to betrayers. The other parameters of the game,
such as the users’ update strategy and the percentage of rewarded nodes, can
drastically modify the impact of α and b. Therefore, it is important to consider
that the proposed mechanism only incentives the target community, when
users’ update their strategy using local information.
However, in Section 5 we shown that in cooperative applications — where users
can freely choose their cooperation level — there is a wide range of cooperation
ratios, in contrast to our early experiments. Similar situations cane be found
in online social networks [132, 133]. Therefore, in order to enrich our results
and to test the robustness of our proposal; we consider next a more realistic
scenario based on real data gathered from users’ behavior in Guifi.net [26], the
largest active Wireless Community Network (See Section 3.1.2).
In this new model, we have substituted the random position assignment by
a new similarity function, based on the number of messages sent by each
user during the whole period of time. Then, we computed the Probability
Integral Transformation (PTI) of the interactions between users, which maps
the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of a given continous random
variable X to a uniform distribution [79], and removed all the values below
a given percentile (q). As a result, we have a function that describes the
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distribution between the different social efforts done (measured as the number
of messages sent) by the (1− q) percentage of most active users in the network.
During the normalization process we have cropped the results to the range
[0.025, 0.045], in which the α values guarantee a higher percentage of coopera-
tion for the rewarded nodes. Figure 8.8 shows how probability functions can
be normalize by mapping their Cumulative Distribution Function (8.8a), and
the result after applying the mentioned technique to our dataset (8.8b).
(a) Theoretical model (b) Real model (number of messages)
Figure 8.8: Mapping function from social effort-score to α
This method has two clear advantages: (1) it can be adapted to any probability
distribution regardless the way used to compute the social effort score, making
the new score comparable to any previous incentive and (2) it maintains a
proportion of scores based in the original heterogeneity of the users’ social
effort.
Figure 8.9 shows the distribution of cooperation percentage achieved by the
nodes, when some portion of them (p) is rewarded using the proposed motiva-
tion mechanism. Each line represents a group of users, considering b = 1.1, and
a REP update strategy, to make the results comparable with those presented
in the previous section. The cooperation percentage of each node represents, as
always, the average number of rounds in which the node decides to cooperate,
considering the last 250 rounds.
As shown in Figure 8.9, a higher percentage of users with positive values of
α, produces higher cooperation levels when they play the extended versions
of the PD, as we expected according to our framework. Then, we evaluated
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Figure 8.9: Users’ cumulative cooperation distribution using a realistic distri-
bution of social reward values.
the system using the same distribution of α, but with higher percentages of
rewarded nodes. It was done by adapting the top percentile of messages (q).
We found that unlike the theoretical results — where the difference between
the PD and the EPD strategies increases proportionally with the number
of rewarded nodes —, when we applied a more realistic distribution, the
improvement of the cooperation is almost unnoticeable if the size of both nodes
groups remain similar. The most intuitive reason to explain such a phenomena
is that more scaled social rewards could mask the difference between rewarded
and no-rewarded nodes.
8.4 Generalizing the incentive mechanism
We have observed that it is possible to influence positively the cooperation
ratio among users using the EPD strategy and a transfer function from some
externality — in our case, the social score (α). To complete the incentive
147
framework, in this section we present a generalization of our model, which
includes the effort-based incentive mechanism discussed early on in this work
(See Section 5), the new social score (See 8.3.6) and the transfer function.
Recall that we defined in our computational model the set of resources’ slots
available for a user i as a non empty set Ri = {R1i , R2i , R3i . . . RMi }. Each job
then, has an associated minimum cost in terms of the set of resource’ slots
W without which the job cannot be done. When a user i receives a request
at time t from another user j, it shares a proportional number of slots to
P (W, t). In our generalized model, the percentage of resources is described by
the Equation 8.1.
P (W, t) = γ
(
1
M
M∑
k=1
rkji(t−1)
Rkj
)
+µ
(
1
L
L∑
l=1
αj(t−1)
)
where γ+µ = 1 (8.1)
The equation has two different components — the main activity and the
different supporting activities — which are weighted by factors γ, µ.
γ, µ = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1} (8.2)
The first component of Equation 8.1 denotes the sum of effort done by the
user j sharing resources with node i in the previous round, for each type of
resource k. The second component represents the sum of social efforts of user
j on each of the L supporting activities. The parameter α, is the social score:
αi(t) = F (X : βi(t)→ R) (8.3)
where X is a function provided by the system designer to transform each social
position β into a real number, and the function F is its Probability Integral
Transformation.
Notice that this generalization can be further expanded too, giving a different
weight to each resource type k and to each supporting activity l. However,
in practice the number of computational resources involved is not as large to
require such expansion, and the social score can be simplified by using our
extended framework for detecting roles and positions (See 7.4.3).

Chapter9
Conclusions
This work makes several contributions to the design of incentive mechanisms for
governing distributed infrastructures aimed to share computational resources
unevenly distributed among nodes.
We firstly describe a regulation mechanism for increasing the cooperation
opportunities of nodes with fewer resources and show how it indirectly improves
the utilization of resources, while increases the overall amount of satisfied tasks
in the system. The incentive is based on concepts from participatory economics,
seeking to promote the cooperation willingness and effort rather than to just
increase the absolute contribution of nodes — as other contributory-based
mechanisms do.
The most important drawback of the mechanism is that it is not envy-free.
Therefore, nodes with larger amount of resources might be reluctant to adopt
the new policy, as some of them could get more resources from the system by
switching to traditional contributory-based incentives. In this work we show
how this situation can be avoided by reusing some of the ideas developed by
Ostrom [6], and providing the community of users with the necessary tools to
enforce and guarantee that nodes comply with the governing rules.
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For a policy to being enforced by a community of practitioners, the existence
of users able and willing to devote their time and effort must be guaranteed.
We proposed a second incentive mechanism to encourage users’ participation
on supporting tasks by rewarding them with some benefits in the sharing
environment. It required also developing a new framework for detecting roles
and positions in multiplex graphs.
We additionally show how to encourage the cooperation among nodes with
fewer resources in scarcity scenarios by providing and placing community-
owned computational resources in key positions of the overlay network. We
find evidences that topologies with some structural properties are more suitable
than other for these tasks, and evaluated their performance in a collaborative
scenario.
Limitations
The evaluation of the mechanisms presented in this work is limited by the
computational model simulated and the simulator itself. It affects especially
to the results related with the social behaviour of the supporting community.
In this work we were able to provide mechanisms for measuring the social
participation and for influencing the collaborative process, but we were unable
to test how these implementations would affect the social behaviour of a
real collective. We can only assume that players are rational, and that as
a consequence some of them would choose to participate in the supporting
activities because the positive reward — in particular, selfish users who will
try to avoid sharing their own resources.
Besides that, most of the scenarios modeled were assumed static. This was a
conscious decision to simplify the model and easier the interpretation of the
results. However, most components of cooperative applications (e.g., overlay
network, users) have a dynamic behaviour. This observation is also relevant
for modeling the relations between users in the participatory forums.
Implications
This thesis reflects the role of users’ communities in the development of govern-
ing policies for distributed architectures, especially in encouraging and ruling
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the cooperative process of sharing resources. The integration of users’ activities
on computational common-pool resources opens new research perspectives to
emerging computational architectures which, directly or indirectly, are adopt-
ing the common-pool resources model [34, 134]. The feasibility of each of
the mechanisms proposed in this thesis, however, depends on the state of the
community.
According to the life-cycle proposed by Iriberri et.al. [135], online communities
are identified as mature, when “the need for a more explicit and formal organi-
zation with regulations, rewards for contributions, subgroups, and discussion
of more or less specific topics is evident.”. At this stage, the relation and inter-
action among members are long-lived, and most of the culture of communities
of interest and communities of practice are evident.
Therefore, from this stage on if the community is attached to a cooperative
application it would be ready to implement and enforce governing rules aimed
to share common resources like, for example, the effort-based mechanisms
described in Chapter 5. There is no need for enforcing the users’ participation in
the community or its supporting activities because even when the incorporation
of new members might cause an adjustment of community roles — and modify
its internal dynamics —, if the dialog is still present the excitement will continue
nurturing the collective actions [136].
The social incentives (See Chapters 5 and 8) are needed, instead, during the
growth stage, when the technological components are in place, and the roles
are being or have already been established. Usually in this stage, lurkers —
users consuming information from the online community without contributing
— begin to appear, making more necessary the encouragement of volunteers
and leaders to guarantee that the community arrives to the mature stage.
It is evident that before the community of users exists — or it is in its
early stages: inception and creation —, the inventive policies based on effort
measurements cannot be applied. Those mechanisms aimed for sharing physical
resources are not effective because they need some externality to enforce
them, while those measured as social interactions cannot be measured if the
community does not exist. The lack of opportunities for cooperation on devices
with fewer resources can only be fought by adding new resources to the common
pool. This can be done because new users are participating of the main activity
or because the new resources are contributed collectively (See Chapter 6).
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This perspective highlights the community of supporters as the main reason to
use each of the mechanisms presented in this work, despite that the community
of users was initially a tool, and not a catalyst. This is important, as we have
seen, in presence of different life-cycles between users — those participating of
the main activity sharing resources — and supporters [P8].
Future directions
Regulating how cooperative users share resources is an old challenge. New
research advancements in the areas of information systems and economics
enable researchers to address more complex problems related with the main
challenge. Two of the novel principles — participatory economics and collective
governing policies — presented in this thesis are of particular interest from
our point of view.
Using participatory economic principles for regulating computational pool
resources has proved a good solution to build fairer incentives, but the under-
laying consequences require further investigation. In this thesis we were able to
support non envy-free incentives by using some externality — the community
of users. However, most distributed applications might not have a community
of practitioners in which delegate these tasks. Economic markets, however,
have been proved stable solutions to implement dynamic regulations of compu-
tational resources. It would be of great interest to implement participatory
economic principles in the bidding process of economic markets.
The user community as such has never been previously used as part of the
solution in computer architectures. Previous works considered users just
rational agents who intended to maximize their payoff. We have changed this
perspective, and proposed a model where there is an ecosystem formed by
supporters and regular users who interact with the distributed architecture —
and the governing mechanisms — in different ways. Understand better how
this interactions occur, when and what are the consequences for the resource
sharing application are fundamental. In this work, for instance, we captured
these interactions through the exchange of messages in online participatory
forums, which will limit the scope of the information gathered, and might hide
other forms of participation. Furthermore, we studied the effect of encouraging
the participation of users in the supporting activities, by rewarding them in
the main one which poses the next questions: Can we do it the other way
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around (encouraging the participation in the main activity by rewarding users
in the supporting ones)? Can we apply both policies at the same time?
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